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THE ATTRIBUTION RIGHT IN THE UNITED STATES:
CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE BETWEEN COPYRIGHT
AND SECTION 43(A)
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall*
Abstract: The human impulse for attribution symbolizes the linkage between an author
and her creative work. In many countries, authors are afforded a right of attribution as part of
a broader doctrine known as moral rights. The United States, however, does not adequately
protect moral rights. This Article focuses exclusively on the right of attribution as one
component of the moral rights doctrine. Initially, it examines the connection between
copyright law and the right of attribution and establishes the inadequacy of the current
copyright law as a means of safeguarding the right of attribution. Next, it addresses why
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which frequently has been hailed as a viable substitute for
the right of attribution, is an inadequate safeguard for the attribution interest. The underlying
theme of this Article is that because United States' copyright law and section 43(a) are
grounded in objectives other than the personality and non-monetary interests with which the
right of attribution is concerned, the federal enactment of a right of attribution applicable to a
broad category of copyrightable works is vital. The adoption of this approach is necessary for
protecting fully the authorial interests that currently are insufficiently addressed under our
legal system. Such explicit recognition for a right of attribution can be accomplished with a
relatively minimal degree of controversy and disruption to our current legal fabric.
The right of attribution recognizes a fundamental truth about human
nature-people typically desire recognition for their accomplishments. A
corollary of this fundamental truth is that people should not receive
attribution for something that is not their creation. Both the desire to
receive attribution where warranted, and to be free from false
attributions, are grounded in the realities of the creation process.
Authors' draw inspiration for creation from the powerful forces deep
within their souls. When this inspiration becomes manifest in the form of
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I. This Article uses the term "authors" in its broadest possible sense to denote those who are
involved in the artistic creation of any genre of work presently, or even potentially, within the scope
of copyright protection.
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a concrete work of authorship, that work reflects the individual
spirituality and personality of the author. As such, the work embodies a
concrete connection with its author and the human need for attribution
symbolizes this linkage.
In many countries, authors are afforded the right of attribution as part
of a broader doctrine known as moral rights.2 The right of attribution,
together with the right of integrity and the right of disclosure, form the
backbone of moral rights doctrine in the majority of those countries
where this doctrine is viable. These three components of moral rights
doctrine reflect the "unmistakable reality that this doctrine is concerned
with protecting the author's personal dignity and the human spirit
reflected in her artistic creations."3 The right of integrity guarantees that
the author's work truly represents her creative personality and thus
prohibits misrepresentations of an author's expression.4 The right of
disclosure affords the author the ability to determine the timing of a
work's public dissemination.5 The right of attribution safeguards to the
author the right to be recognized as the author of her work, and to
prevent others from being designated as the author.6
I have argued elsewhere that the act of creation embodies the author's
personality-based narrative of creation to the extent that the creative
process implicates the honor, dignity, and artistic spirit of the author in a
fundamentally personal way. The author's personality-based narrative of
creation emphasizes the infusion of the self into one's work, and thus
provides the framework for moral rights. At bottom, therefore, moral
rights are inherent to the extent that they are concerned primarily with
safeguarding the author's dignity as both an individual and as an author.
2. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage
Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1, 7 (1985) [hereinafter American Marriage].
3. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, "Author-Stories": Narrative's Implications for Moral Rights and
Copyright's Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 23 (2001) [hereinafter "Author-
Stories"].
4. American Marriage, supra note 2, at 7.
5. Id.
6. The right of attribution also recognizes that at times authors simply want the flexibility of
negative recognition, which means they desire the ability to create anonymously or under a
pseudonym. See id.; see also infra note 254 and accompanying text.
7. "Author-Stories" supra note 3, at 23. Renowned artist Marc Chagall spoke of the "spirituality"
inherent in the artistic process when he observed: "Painting... seemed like a window I could escape
out of, to take flight to another world." NATAILE BOBER, MARC CHAGALL: PAINTER OF DREAMS 90
(Jewish Publ'n Soc'y 1991). See also Barry Oretsky, Making the Mystical Transition, FARBREBGEN
7 (Winter 2001) ("I find a wonderful spirituality occurs when the creative process is expressed in
paint.").
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The interest which moral rights serves essentially is a spiritual one which
transcends the author's concern for property or even reputation.8
In the United States, adequate protection for authors' moral rights is
sorely lacking. To a limited extent, the moral rights of attribution and
integrity are incorporated on a federal level in the Visual Artists Rights
Act (VARA).9 VARA was enacted in 1990, two years after the United
States joined the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works. 0 VARA affords certain visual artists" relief against
intentional modifications that will prejudice their honor or reputation, as
well as the right to prevent the use of their names in conjunction with
works that have been changed in a prejudicial manner.' More recently,
the "copyright management information" provisions of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) appear to require a form of
attribution in the Internet environment to the extent that they prohibit the
dissemination of false information, and proscribe the removal or
alteration of copyright management information."
This Article examines the right of attribution. It demonstrates the need
for the explicit adoption of a federal right of attribution applicable to a
broad category of copyrightable works. Part I illuminates the connection
between copyright law and the right of attribution. Initially, this part
illustrates the need for a right of attribution in the United States by
highlighting two recent copyright struggles. Part I then focuses on the
inadequacy of the current economically-based copyright law as a means
8. "Author-Stories" supra note 3, at 24.
9. 17 U.S.C. § 101A (2000).
10. The Berne Convention is the oldest multilateral treaty governing copyright protection.
11. VARA protections are limited to visual artists who create certain categories of works which
include paintings, dravings, prints, sculptures, or still photographic images produced for exhibition
purposes only. Id. § 101A. For a detailed discussion of the various narratives that both shaped, and
were rejected, by Congress in enacting VARA, see "Author-Stories", supra note 3, at 26-43.
12. 17 U.S.C § 106A(a)(2) (2000).
13. Section 1202 treats maintaining the integrity of copyright management information. Section
1202(a) prohibits the provision or distribution of false copyright management information if done
"knowingly and with the intent to induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal infringement." Section
1202(b) prohibits the intentional removal or alteration of copyright management information, and
the distribution of such altered works. 17 U.S.C. § 1202 (2000). See also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall,
Moral Rights for University Employees and Students: Can Educational Institutions Do Better than
the U.S. Copyright Law?. 27 J.C. & U.L. 53, 55 n.16 (2000) [hereinafter Moral Rights for University
Employees]. See Generally Jane Ginsburg, II. Art and the Law: Suppression and Liberty-Have
Moral Rights Come of (Digital) Age in the United States?, 19 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. IJ. 9 (2000);
Justin Hughes, The Line Between Work and Framework, Text and Context, 19 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. LJ. 19 (2000).
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of safeguarding the personal interests protected by the right of
attribution.
Part II examines section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which frequently
has been touted as the one federal enactment capable of safeguarding the
right of attribution. 4 By proscribing "false designations of origin" and
false descriptions or representations in connection with any goods or
services,' 5 section 43(a) can be invoked as a basis for relief in reverse
passing off cases where copyrightable works are misattributed,16 or even
unattributed.Y This part reviews the conflicting law on the application of
section 43(a) in this context. It demonstrates that in light of section
43(a)'s preoccupation with consumer protection, this provision is of
limited utility in safeguarding the right of attribution.
The case law discussed in the first two parts of this Article
demonstrates that United States' copyright law and section 43(a) are
grounded in objectives other than the personality and non-monetary
interests with which the right of attribution is concerned. Consequently,
the adoption of an express right of attribution is the only approach
capable of fully protecting the authorial interests that currently are
insufficiently addressed under our legal system. Part III argues that the
federal enactment of an explicit right of attribution applicable to all
copyrightable works can be accomplished with a relatively minimal
degree of controversy and disruption to our current legal fabric.
I. THE RIGHT OF ATTRIBUTION AND COPYRIGHT LAW
Moral rights are designed to protect the dignity, self-worth, and
autonomy of authors." In many countries, moral rights are viewed as a
subset of copyright law, the body of law with specific responsibility for
safeguarding authors' interests. It is generally assumed that moral rights
attach only to works that are copyrightable, although this assumption
never has been specifically questioned or explored in depth.2' Thus, in
14. See Final Report ofAd Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention,
reprinted in 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS, 555 (1986); H.R, REP. No. 100-609, at 38 (1988).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
16. See infra notes 110, 113 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
18. "Author-Stories, "supra note 3, at 23.
19. See American Marriage, supra note 2, at 97-100 (appendix detailing moral rights protections
as part of the copyright law in 35 countries).
20. Of course, the requirements for copyright protection do vary from one country to another. For
example, whereas in the United States "fixation" is a statutory requirement for copyright protection,
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those countries where the right of attribution applies, it attaches to
copyrightable works of authorship.
In the United States, copyright law is concerned almost exclusively
with protecting the pecuniary interests of copyright owners rather than
the personal interests of author-creators. 2 Therefore, where authors
retain their copyright interests copyright law will afford them economic
protection.' The failure of American copyright law to incorporate moral
rights protections precludes authors from relying on copyright's
provisions to safeguard key personal interests such as the right of
attribution. The following subpart illustrates the connection between the
right of attribution and copyright law by recounting the stories of two
copyright plaintiffs, both of whom were aggrieved by the defendants'
failure to afford them a right of attribution. In one instance, the plaintiff s
right of attribution was violated in conjunction with a work whose
copyright status was of a questionable nature. In the second case, the
plaintiffs independent contribution to a copyrighted work arguably was
insufficiently recognized. Both of these situations illustrate how the right
of attribution interfaces with copyright law, despite copyright's lack of
explicit protection for this right.
A. Modern Plays and Ancient Scrolls
The lawsuits initiated by Lynn Thomson, a dramaturg' from New
York, and Elisha Qimron, an Israeli law professor specializing in Hebrew
language, have much in common. Though they involve completely
different subject matter, and were litigated in different countries, at
bottom both Thomson and Qimron were seeking recognition for their
significant contributions to important works.
many countries protect both fixed and unfixed works under their copyright laws without
differentiation. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Preserving Personality and Reputational Interests of
Constructed Personas Through Moral Rights: A Blueprint for the Twenty-First Century, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REV. 151, 163 (2001).
21. See "Author-Stories', supra note 3 at 16-22 (providing a detailed treatment of copyright law's
submergence of the author's voice, resulting in a legal framework that is insufficiently sensitive to
authorial perspectives about the creative process).
22. Although any of the rights protected by copyright law can be assigned in whole, or in part, see
17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2000), the copyright statute also contemplates that an author who parts with
legal title but remains a "beneficial owner" can sue for copyright infringement. See id. § 501(b). For
a fuller discussion of this issue, see American Marriage, supra note 2, at 48.
23. According to Thomson, a "dramaturg is a theater artist who brings an expertise in
collaborative process, research skills, and critical thinking to the making of theater." See "Author-
Stories, " supra note 3at 45 n.200.
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Lynn Thomson, a dramaturg and stage director, was hired by the New
York Theater Workshop to assist playwright Jonathan Larson to clarify
and transform the story line of what became the award-winning play
Rent. 4 Her complaint alleged that "she developed the plot and theme,
contributed extensively to the story, created many character elements,
wrote a significant portion of the dialogue and song lyrics, and made
other copyrightable contributions to the Work."' Larson died suddenly,
hours after the final dress rehearsal. Thomson then attempted,
unsuccessfully, to negotiate with Larson's heirs for a percentage of the
play's royalties.26 Ultimately, Thomson sued Larson's heirs, claiming co-
authorship status; in Thomson's own words, she sought "credit and
compensation."" Thomson did not prevail.
The right of attribution and copyright's joint authorship law are linked
at a fundamental level. Specifically, a successful suit for joint authorship
enables a plaintiff to obtain not only compensation, but also personal
recognition from her creative community, including the right to be
publicly acknowledged as an author of the work created.2" The district
court held that Thomson was not a joint author, and the Second Circuit
affirmed this holding on the ground that Larson lacked co-authorship
intent.2
9
Critical to the Second Circuit's ultimate determination was its
application of a test for joint authorship that requires all putative co-
authors to establish both independent copyrightability of each
contribution and intent by all putative authors, at the time of the
collaboration, that they be co-authors.3" This test for joint authorship,
emphasizing "intention to be co-authors,"represents a departure from the
statutory definition of a joint work which incorporates a test focusing on
whether the parties intended to merge their contributions into
"inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole."'"
24. Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 198 n.10 (2d Cir. 1998).
25. Id. at 198 n.10.
26. See "Author-Stories, " supra note 3, at 45 n.200.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. Thomson, 147 F.3d at 202.
30. In the Second Circuit, this test for joint authorship initially was articulated in Childress v.
Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (definition of a "joint work"). Interestingly, the legislative history
posits yet another interpretative test for joint authorship which focuses on collaboration or intention
to merge. H.R. REP. No. 94-1475, at 120 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736; S.
REP. No. 94-473, at 103-04 (1975).
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Similarly, Professor Elisha Qimron's right of attribution was deemed
violated by the Israeli Supreme Court.32 Qimron's case involved the
defendants' publication in the United States of the deciphered
reconstructed text of a particular Dead Sea Scroll,3 3 with the credit for the
reconstruction and decipherment being attributed to Harvard professor
John Strugnell, working "with a colleague." 34The unnamed colleague
was Professor Qimron, who at the time was a junior untenured
academic.3
Originally, access to and study of the scrolls found in the Qumran
Caves were under the authority of the Jordanian government, pursuant to
its jurisdiction over Qumran at the time the scrolls were discovered.36
Following the Six Day War, the scrolls were transferred from the
Rockefeller Museum in Jerusalem to the State of Israel, and the
Antiquities Authority continued Jordan's policy of exclusivity regarding
the number and identity of researchers allowed access to the scrolls.37
Initially, Professor Strugnell attempted to compile the thousands of
discovered fragments into one scroll. Although Strugnell was able to
identify about a hundred fragments of the scroll and match them into
between sixty and seventy fragments, the enormity of the task required
an individual with linguistic and Halakhic" knowledge which Strugnell
lacked.39
32. See Unofficial Translation of The Dead Sea Scrolls Case, at 3, August 30, 2000 (Michael
Bimhack trans., 2000) [hereinafter Unofficial Translation] (on file with author).
33. The first Dead Sea Scroll was discovered in 1947 by accident. See David Nimmrer, Copyright
in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and Originality, 38 HOUS. L REV. 1, 50 (2001). The scroll in
question in this lawsuit was discovered in the 1950's in Cave #4 of Qumran in the Judean Desert.
See Unofficial Translation, supra note 32, at 3. Six copies of the scroll were contained in Cave #4,
although none of them were complete. Professor Qimron named this document "Miqsat Ma'ase ha-
Torah" (in English, "Rulings Pertaining to the Torah") (referred to in the court's opinion as MMT).
See id. at 4; Nimmer, supra, at 55). In MMT, the Teacher of Righteousness addresses Jonathan
Maccabe, the High Priest. See David L. Cohen, Copyrighting the Dead Sea Scrolls: Qimron v.
Shanks, 52 ME. L. REV. 379, 384 (2000).
34. See Nimmer, supra note 33, at 66.
35. See id.
36. Jordan authorized a limited international team of researchers to study the scrolls. For a
thorough and insightful commentary of the Dead Sea Scrolls saga, see JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING
DARTS WITH REMBRANDT-PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES 153-64 (Univ.
Michigan Press 1999).
37. Unofficial Translation, supra note 32, at 10.
38. Halakhah, or Jewish law, denotes the entire subject matter of the Jewish legal system. See
Michael J. Broyde & Steven Resnicoff, Jewish Law and Modern Business Structures: The Corporate
Paradigm, 43 WAYNE L, REV. 1685, 1687-88 n.1 (1997).
39. Unofficial Translation, supra note 32, at 4.
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In 1981, Professor Qimron joined Strugnell, and Qimron subsequently
worked for eleven years deciphering the scroll.4" From the sixty to
seventy fragments Qimron received from Strugnell, Qimron compiled a
text of 121 lines, referred to in the court's opinion as "the deciphered
text."'4' In 1990, Qimron and Strugnell reached an agreement with the
English Oxford Press regarding publication of the deciphered text, along
with photographs of the scroll's fragments and interpretation.4
Defendant Hershel Shanks is an attorney and editor of an
archaeological review published by the Biblical Archaeological Society
(BAS).43 In 1991, prior to the publication of the deciphered text by the
English Oxford Press, Shanks and BAS published in the United States
the book Facsimile Edition of the Dead Sea Scrolls. This book contained
the 120-line deciphered reconstructed text of the scroll and a set of nearly
1,800 photos of unpublished scroll fragments.' In his book, Shanks
explained his decision to reproduce the 120-line reconstruction, and
credited the reconstruction to Strugnell and "a colleague." '4
Professor Qimron promptly filed a lawsuit in an Israeli court, charging
Shanks and BAS with copyright infringement based on the publication of
the deciphered text. Qimron also alleged a violation of his moral right of
attribution based on Strugnell's failure to mention his name in the BAS
publication. The trial court found in favor of Qimron, awarding him
100,000 shekels (about $25,000), reportedly the largest amount ever
awarded in a case of this kind in Israel.4" The Israeli Supreme Court
subsequently upheld the decision.
The case was decided under Israeli law, even though the infringement
occurred in the United States. "7 Qimron's complaint raises two
40. See id. Professor Qimron is a Professor of Hebrew Language at Ben-Gurion University in
Be'er Sheeba, where he engages in philological research and specializes in studying the scrolls
found in the Qumran Caves.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. The review published by Shanks is the BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGY REVIEW, which has a
circulation of over half a million readers.
44. Nimmer, supra note 33, at 66. Many observers believe that Shanks' publication of this work
broke the monopoly held by the scholars assigned to publish the scrolls in the 1950's. During the
trial in the Israeli district court, Shanks testified that "he has been a voice to all those who remained
outside the 'research cartel'." See Unofficial Translation, supra note 32, at 11.
45. Nimmer, supra note 33, at 66.
46. Id. at 70-71. For a discussion of the Israeli district court opinion, see Cohen, supra note 33.
47. The Israeli district court justified its decision to apply Israeli law based on the presumption
that the law in the United States is the same as that in Israel. Unofficial Translation, supra note 32, at
7; see also Cohen, supra note 33, at 388 (explaining the "presumption of equal laws" doctrine). On
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fascinating intellectual property issues: first, whether Qimron has a
copyright in the deciphered text; and second, whether the defendants
violated Qimron's right of attribution by publishing the text without
mentioning his name.4s
In addressing the copyright infringement issue, the Israeli district
court concluded that the phases of Qimron's work must be viewed in the
aggregate, rather than in isolation:
This process, at the end of which the collection of fragments
became a complete text, that bears content and meaning, included
several phases of creation: matching the fragments based on their
physical compatibility, arranging the matching "islands" of
fragments and placing them in the putative place in the scroll,
deciphering the written text on the fragments, to the extent that
such deciphering is required and filling the gaps between the
fragments. In the creation of any of these phases there has been a
different level or originality and creativity, but nevertheless, there
is no place for examining each phase on its own. In this case, the
various phases of the work are tied together, interdependent, and
have mutual influence upon each other.49
Upon an examination of the work as a whole, the court concluded that it
revealed originality and creativity, so that "the additional soul" Qimron
poured into the fragments converted them into a living text capable of
copyright protection. 50 Thus, because the defendants engaged in an
unauthorized publication of the scroll, they committed copyright
infringement under Israeli law."
The attribution of authorship issue in Qimron v. Shanks reinforces the
link between the moral right of attribution and copyright law. In those
countries where moral rights exist, such as in Israel, they attach to
appeal, the Supreme Court held that Israeli law applies because three copies of the defendant's work
were shipped to Israel by the publisher defendants. See Cohen, supra note 33, at 398 ("[T]he fact
that a shipment of three books to Israel was sufficient to trigger Israel's long-arm jurisdiction should,
in this increasingly globalized world, raise alarm bells in corporate counsel's offices the world
over.").
48. For a discussion of how the copyright infringement issue presented in Qimron might have
been addressed under United States law, see infra note 254.
49. Unofficial Translation, supra note 32, at 17-18.
50. Id. at 18.
51. Id. at 32, at 21-22. This case was "the first case in the world to recognize the
copyrightability... of a scholarly reconstruction of an ancient text.' Cohen, supra note 33, at 381.
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copyrightable works.5 2 Relying on section 4A of the Israeli Copyright
Ordinance, which provides that "[a]n author is entitled that his name be
attributed to his work in a reasonable scope and extent, ' 13 the Israeli
Supreme Court observed that "a person is entitled that his name be
attributed to the 'children of his spirit.', 4 The court concluded that
Shanks' deliberate omission of Qimron's name was "contemptuous and
mockery. '55 Moreover, Shanks' failure to mention Qimron's name under
the circumstances of the case was, according to the court, "even more
insulting than no mentioning at all." As such, the "with a colleague"
designation was insufficient to fulfill the attribution right imposed by
Israeli law, as well as the "human-moral duty.,
5 6
The significance of the attribution violation to Professor Qimron is
evidenced by his admission following the Israeli Supreme Court's ruling
that had Shanks listed his name in the defendants' publication, Qimron
probably would not have initiated the lawsuit.57 Qimron's observation in
this regard underscores the reality that for many creators, some qualities,
such as professional reputation and artistic dignity, are more important
than money. 8
As discussed earlier, the only explicit federal moral rights protections
in the United States derive from VARA's prohibition of unauthorized
modifications and misattributions regarding certain forms of visual art. 9
Clearly, Professor Qimron's attribution right would not have been
protected under United States' copyright law because the scroll does not
52. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
53. Israel adopted moral rights in 1981. See Cohen, supra note 33, at 386.
54. Unofficial Translation, supra note 32, at 29. The Israeli Supreme Court further noted that an
author's spiritual relationship to his works "is akin, almost, to his relationship to his offspring." Id. at
29. For a further discussion of this theme see "Author-Stories" supra note 3, at 61-62.
55. Unofficial Translation, supra note 32, at 29.
56. Id. at 30.
57. Nimmer, supra note 33, at 146 n.714. Although not the focus of the court's opinion, the case
also involved the moral right of disclosure. The court concluded that the defendants' publication of
"the deciphered text in its entirety, without mentioning Qimron's name, ... infringed his right to be
the first to publish the deciphered text." Unofficial Translation, supra note 32, at 25. In fact, the
Israeli district court grounded its holding of mental distress based on the pain suffered by Qimron as
a result of his being deprived of the opportunity to be the first editor of the scroll, with the benefit of
having his ideas shape the future scholarly debate. See Nimmer, supra note 33, at 145; Cohen, supra
note 33, at 395.
58. See "Author-Stories", supra note 3, at 22-25.
59. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. But see supra note 13 and accompanying text
(discussing the "copyright management information" provisions of the DMCA); infra notes 73-75
and accompanying text.
Vol. 77:985, 2002
United States' Attribution Right
constitute a work of visual art as defined in VARA.6° Therefore, even if a
United States court would have been inclined to rule in favor of
Professor Qimron on the copyright infiingement claim,6' his right of
attribution would not necessarily have been protected. As discussed more
fully below, apart from VARA, the United States copyright law does not
expressly incorporate protection for a right of attribution. Therefore, any
protection for the right of attribution deriving from copyright law's
application is merely fortuitous.
B. Copyright's Failure To Protect Attribuion Interests
The objective of the right of attribution is to insure that the creator of a
work receives recognition as the author.6 Based on this justification for
the right of attribution, it would seem as though the right of attribution
shares with copyright law a theoretical basis that incorporates concern
for the provision of incentives to authors. Although the United States
Supreme Court has stated on numerous occasions that the primary
purpose of the copyright monopoly is to promote the arts and sciences,
financial rewards to creators clearly is a secondary concern. 63 By
60. See, eg., 17 U.S.C §§ 101, 106(A) (2000).
61. The inquiry here would center on whether Qimron's reconstruction of the Dead Sea Scroll
fragments constitutes a sufficiently original work to merit copyright protection. In the actual case,
the defendants argued that Qimron's acts of supplementing the text is simply a reconstruction of an
existing work, and therefore cannot be protected by copyright law. They also argued that protecting
Qimron's reconstruction harms scholarly research, and that according Qimron a copyright amounts
to granting him a property right in part of the cultural heritage of the Jewish people. Unofficial
Translation, supra note 32, at 19. Yet, as discussed in the text, the Israeli courts saw it differently.
The Israeli courts' opinions have been severely criticized by the American legal academy. See,
e.g., Nimmer, supra note 33, at 1-212; Cohen, supra note 33, at 381 (discussing district court
opinion). See also Martha NVoodmansee, Response to David Nimmer, 38 HOuS. L. REv. 231, 233
(2001) (criticizing the result from the standpoint of literary theory); Niva Elkin-Koren, Of Scientific
Claims and Proprietary Rights: Lessons from the Dead Sea Scrolls Case, 38 HOuS. L REv. 445
(2001) (criticizing the result on the ground that Qimron's work was scientific and therefore
incapable of copyright protection). Commentators have pointed out that if all Professor Qimron did
in reconstructing the text was to decipher and track with precision a preexisting document, he should
not enjoy copyright protection for his final product, because that work would not constitute an
original work of authorship. The only originality would be in mistakes. See, eg., Nimmer, supra
note 33, at 113,211. But see Michael Bimhack, The Dead Sea Scrolls Case: Who is an Author, 2001
E.I.P.R 23(3), 128-133, at 132 (suggesting an alternative interpretation of the case that represents a
shift in the originality requirement from an economic perspective to one based on Lockean theory).
See also infra note 259.
62. Alternatively, the right of attribution can be construed as a basis for safeguarding the creator's
anonymity as an author. See infra note 254 and accompanying text.
63. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991). See also H.R. REP.
No. 60-2222, at 7 (1909).
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affording authors a right to reap the reputational benefits of their works,
the right of attribution also is grounded in an incentive-based rationale. 6
Notwithstanding this similarity, copyright law and the right of
attribution are aimed at completely different conduct. Copyright law, as
applied in the United States, is designed to provide an economic remedy
when a work is copied, or otherwise used, in an unlawful capacity.6" The
crux of a copyright violation is unlawful copying, not false
representations concerning the work's authorship. 66 If someone copies a
copyrighted work without the copyright owner's permission, liability
will result even if that person reveals the true author of the work.67
In contrast, the right of attribution is concerned with the dignity and
personality interests of the author, and the ability of the author to
command her reputational due. 68 However, in many lawsuits the
defendant's conduct involves both a failure to attribute authorship as well
as a violation of copyright law's prohibition on unauthorized copying.69
In these circumstances, attribution violations can become enmeshed with
copyright infringement claims. Even so, a plaintiffs ability to recover on
an attribution violation does not turn on whether recovery is warranted
for copyright infringement.
A review of the 1976 Copyright Act illustrates that violating an
author's attribution right does not give rise to liability for copyright
infringement. Section 106 of the statute details the rights provided a
copyright owner, which include the rights to reproduce, distribute,
publicly perform and display, and make a derivative work of the
protected work.7" The statute does not include an author's ability to
64. See Randolph Stuart Sergent, Building Reputational Capital: The Right of Attribution Under
Section 43 of the Lanham Act, 19 CoLuM.-VLA J. L & ARTS 45, 75 (1994-95).
65. See John Cross, Giving Credit Where Credit is Due: Revisiting the Doctrine of Reverse
Passing Off in Trademark Law, 72 WASH. L. REv. 709,734 (1997).
66. Id. at 734 n.102 (noting the copyright act considers "only whether defendant reproduced the
protected work..., not whether defendant acknowledged plaintiff as the author"). See also Suntrust
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1280 (11 th Cir. 2001) ("[I]t is not copyright's job to
'protect the reputation' of a work or guard it from 'taint' in any sense except an economic one.");
Waldman Pub. Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 781 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that copyright allows
an owner to "control who publishes, sells or otherwise uses a work," whereas the Lanham Act
ensures an author "that his or her name is associated with a work when the work is used").
67. Cross, supra note 65, at 734.
68. See Kwall, "Author Stories",supra note 3.
69. Id.
70. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(5) (2000). A derivative work is defined as "a work based upon one or
more preexisting work.., in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." Id. § 101
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compel recognition for her work among the rights specifically
enumerated. 7 Further, if a right of attribution was commonly understood
to be included among the specified rights of a copyright owner, Congress
would not have deemed it necessary to enact the provision of VARA that
explicitly provides a right of attribution for certain types of works of
visual art.72 Moreover, even though section 1202 of the DMCA has been
interpreted as affording a right of attribution in the context of digital
works,' some support exists for the position that the DMCA's provisions
codify violations distinct from copyright infringement.
In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes,74 a district court for the
Southern District of New York interpreted section 1201(a)(2) of the
DMCA, which prohibits trafficking in access circumvention devices.75
The court rejected the fair use defense on the ground that the defendants
were not being sued for copyright infringement, but rather access
circumvention.76 By observing that "[i]f Congress had meant the fair use
defense to apply to such actions, it would have said so,"" the court
suggested that access circumvention is a separate violation from
copyright infringement. By analogy, it can be argued that the copyright
management information restrictions contained in section 1202 similarly
embody a theory distinct from copyright infi-ngement. More
significantly, these restrictions are of limited scope given their exclusive
applicability to the digital context.
Thus, on its face the 1976 Act fails to incorporate a right of attribution
independent of specific statutory amendments such as VARA and the
DMCA. Of course, an author may be able to obtain protection for the
(definition of a "derivative work"). In addition, § 106 provides for public performance of a sound
recording by means of a digital audio transmission. See id. § 106(6).
71. See American Marriage, supra note 2, at 88. In discussing the issue of whether state
protections for moral rights would be preempted by the 1976 Act, this pre-VARA article notes that
except for the "work for hire" doctrine, nothing in the 1976 Act specifically bears upon a creator's
right of attribution. Therefore, state created rights of attribution would not violate directly the 1976
Act. See also infra text following note 220.
72. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1) (2000). See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text; Cross, supra
note 65, at 749.
73. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
74. 82 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d
429 (2d Cir. 2001).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 218-19; see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 459 (2d Cir.
2001); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12A.03[D][1] at 12A-
33.
77. Corley, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 219.
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attribution interest pursuant to judicially imposed discretionary
injunctive relief. However, in such instances the attribution interest is
protected only as a result of the scope of discretion afforded courts in
fashioning injunctions under section 502 of the 1976 Act.78
Moreover, courts have interpreted the 1976 Act to foreclose its
application to remedy attribution violations in the absence of copyright
infringement. In Wolfe v. United Artists Corp.,7 9 the plaintiff song writer
alleged that defendants violated his copyright by omitting his name as
the author of the composition and designating another as the copyright
owner in the defendants' book in which the composition appeared. The
court noted that the case law treats authorship attribution issues as
contractual claims because it is not infringement to remove a credit to
authorship in publishing a work pursuant to an otherwise valid licensing
agreement.8" The court thus dismissed the plaintiff's copyright claims
since they did not arise under the 1976 Act for purposes of conferring
federal subject matter jurisdiction. 81 The implicit rationale of this
decision is that the 1976 Act fails to incorporate the moral right of
attribution. 2
The copyright statute's failure to incorporate explicitly a right of
attribution, and the judiciary's failure to protect this right unless its
violation coincides with a finding of copyright infringement, results in at
least four possible situations in which authors are left without sufficient
protections for their attribution interests. As the Wolfe case demonstrates,
one type of dispute arises when the plaintiff assigns to the defendant one
or more of the copyrights and the defendant, in the process of exercising
these rights, fails to attribute authorship to the plaintiff. This was also the
situation in Batiste v. Island Records, Inc.3
The basis for the lawsuit in Batiste was that a song written, performed,
and recorded by the plaintiffs, the Batiste brothers, was digitally sampled
by defendant Cordes, a performer, and included in one of Cordes'
musical compositions released by the defendant record companies. "
Before the release of Cordes' composition, the defendant record
78. American Marriage, supra note 2, at 88.
79. 583 F. Supp. 52 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
80. Id. at 56 (citing Richard Wolf v. United Artists Music Co., No. 80-6957, slip op. at 8-10 (2d
Cir. July 21, 1983)). See also infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
81. Wolfe, 583 F. Supp. at 57.
82. American Marriage, supra note 2, at 37-38.
83. 179 F.3d 217 (5th Cir. 1999).
84. Id. at 219.
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company secured the permission to use plaintiffs' song from Bolden, a
local music publisher and record producer to whom one of the plaintiffs
had assigned the copyright in plaintiffs' song. The defendant record
company also paid Bolden a $15,000 advance against the record
royalties." The liner notes accompanying the defendant's album credited
only one of the plaintiff brothers as a co-writer of defendant's song, and
stated that the song sampled by the defendant was performed by the
plaintiffs' band and used under a license by Bolden. 6
The Batiste court affirmed the lower court's determination that the
plaintiffs could assert their copyright infringement claim as beneficial
owners of Bolden's registered copyright despite the copyright
assignment8 7 Ultimately, however, the court ruled that in light of the
contracts between one of the Batiste brothers and Bolden, all of the
copyrights were assigned, and that such grants were sufficient to include
the licensing of a record containing a digital sample of the plaintiffs'
song.8 Thus, the copyright law was not a sufficient substitution for the
right of attribution in this situation because of the existence of a valid
copyright assignment. 9
A second scenario can arise if a particular work is deemed a work
made for hire, resulting in a finding of copyright ownership in someone
other than the actual author of the work. Section 201(b) of the 1976 Act
provides that in the case of a work made for hire, the employer is
considered the author and copyright owner unless the parties expressly
agree otherwise in writing." When this doctrine is applicable, employers
and their licensees are not required to attribute authorship of the work for
hire to the actual creator of the work.9' As one court has observed,
"because the employer is considered the author of the work, once
85. Id. at 220.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 221 n.2. See also 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2000); American Marriage, supra note 2, at 47-49
(favoring a broad interpretation of "beneficial owner" so that all creators who have transferred their
copyrights qualify and therefore have standing to bring infringement actions).
88. Batiste, 179 F.3d at 223.
89. See Natkin v. Winfrey, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1012 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (denying defendant's
motion for summary judgment on the copyright infringement claim on the ground that a trial is
necessary regarding whether the defendant's implied license authorized their publication of the
photographs in question); see also Preta v. Collectibles, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d 1360 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(granting defendant's motion for summary judgment claims dismissing musical composer plaintiff's
copyright claims in a case involving copyright assignment and subsequent failure to attribute
authorship).
90. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
91. For a fuller treatment of this issue see American Marriage, supra note 2, at 57.
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authorship rights are relinquished through a work for hire contract
provision, the right to attribution is also relinquished unless that right is
reserved explicitly in the contract.""2
The 1976 Act provides for two alternate categories of works made for
hire: works prepared by an employee within the scope of his
employment, and works that are commissioned by a written agreement
for particular stipulated uses. 93 Moreover, VARA expressly excludes
works made for hire from its limited coverage. 94 It is unclear to what
extent the work for hire doctrine negatively impacts the exercise of the
attribution right. In terms of those works qualifying as works made for
hire under the second subpart of the statutory definition, courts have
construed the stipulated categories very narrowly, 9' thus arguably
limiting the doctrine's application only to those works specifically
enumerated in the statutory definition. 6 On the other hand, at least one
case interpreting "employee" for purposes of applying the first subpart of
the statutory definition in the context of VARA shows that courts
potentially have an enormous degree of discretion and ability to mold the
legal reasoning of the work for hire doctrine.97
I have argued elsewhere that VARA mistakenly incorporates the work
for hire exclusion on the ground that no compelling reason exists for
92. Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that when author had
agreed to a work for hire arrangement, publisher became author of all materials and was not
contractually obligated to provide author with title credit for his work).
93. The statutory definition of a work for hire, contained in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000), provides that
a "work made for hire" is-
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective
work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer
material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument
signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire ....
94. The protections afforded by VARA only apply to authors of works of "visual art." That term
is defined in § 101 as excluding "any work made for hire."
95. Cleary, 30 F.3d at 1259.
96. Id. at 1260.
97. See Carter v. Helrnsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1208
(1996). In this case, the Second Circuit reversed the district court and held that the VARA work in
question was a work for hire, effectively precluding the application of VARA to the plaintiffs'
lawsuit. In so holding, the Second Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion that the plaintiffs'
ownership of the copyright of the sculpture at issue was a "plus factor," thus refusing to decide
"whether copyright ownership is probative of independent contractor status." Id. at 87. For a
complete critique of this decision, see Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, How Fine Art Fares Post VARA, I
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 1, 5-12 (1997) [hereinafter VARA].
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automatically preventing an employee/author from exercising a right of
attribution.93 Moreover, VARA's exclusion from coverage of works
made for hire is significant in light of the large number of major art
works that are, in fact, works made for hire.99 Beyond the application of
VARA, any author of a work made for hire will be particularly
vulnerable to the copyright statute's failure to safeguard the right of
attribution. '
The case involving Lynn Thomson furnishes a third example of how
copyright law does not sufficiently protect an author's attribution
interest. As discussed, the Second Circuit applied an interpretation of the
joint authorship doctrine that requires all putative co-authors to establish
intent, at the time of the collaboration, to be co-authors.'01 Moreover, the
"intent to be joint authors" standard adopted by the Second Circuit is also
the law in other influential jurisdictions including the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits. 102 This standard makes those who furnish important
contributions to works especially vulnerable to being deprived of their
attribution interests. By requiring all parties to demonstrate the intent to
be co-authors, this standard will favor the story of the dominant
contributor disputing joint authorship. °3
Thomson's story illustrates that given the current application by the
judiciary of copyright's joint authorship provision, non-dominant authors
have little chance of receiving attribution with concomitant
98. See VARA, supra note 97, at 10-12 ("It is not self-evident that the best means of resolving a
VARA dispute is by invoking a legal framework designed to deal with the ownership question in the
completely different context of moral rights."). But see Sheldon Halpern, Of Moral Right and Moral
Righteousness, I MARQ. INTELL. PROP, L REV. 65, 87 (1997) (questioning whether the moral right
question presents a completely different context from the issue of copyright ownership).
99. VARA, supra note 97, at 11 (noting that the Copyright Office has recognized the quantitative
importance of the work for hire doctrine in the context of major art works).
100. See Marina Santilli, United States' Moral Rights Developments in European Perspective, 1
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L REv. 89, 99 (1997) ("The work made for hire doctrine identifies one of the
several areas in which the difference of approach between those jurisdictions that make the right of
attribution vaivable (like the United States and England) and those which do no (like typical civil
law jurisdictions) stands out conspicuously.").
101. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
102. See generally Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1994); Aalmuhammed
v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000).
103. See "Author-Stories" supra note 3, at 55. See also Mary LaFrance, Authorship, Dominance,
and the Captive Collaborator: Preserving the Rights of Joint Authors, 50 EMORY L.J. 193, 262
(2001) (criticizing the "intent to be joint authors" test on the ground that it "places one collaborator
at the mercy of another's subjective intent, even if that intent is never communicated").
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compensation, for their contributions to collective works.' Further, the
absence of an express right of attribution for most types of copyrightable
works diminishes the already minimal bargaining power of non-
dominant authors.° 5
Finally, situations can occur where a court finds that a particular
defendant has infringed the plaintiffs copyright and violated the
plaintiff's attribution interest but nevertheless refuses to enjoin the
defendant's conduct. For example, in Abend v. MCA, Inc., 106 the Ninth
Circuit held that the defendants' exploitation of a derivative work film
violated the plaintiffs renewal copyright in the story, but the court
refused to enjoin the continued exploitation of the defendants' film in
light of the equities involved. 107 Although Abend did not involve an
attribution deprivation, the case is illustrative of situations where, based
on public policy grounds, the alleged infringing activity is allowed to
take place subject to the payment of damages. Even if the defendant is
required to pay damages for its copyright infringement, a payment to the
plaintiff does not necessarily safeguard the authorial interests underlying
the attribution right. In other words, where courts invoke a remedy that
allows the objectionable conduct subject to the payment of damages,
copyright plaintiffs whose attribution interests are violated can be
compensated for copyright infi-ingement but are otherwise vulnerable to
being denied attribution.
104. A joint authorship issue also existed in Qimron v. Shanks. The Israeli Supreme Court
apparently believed that Professor Qimron was an author entitled to attribution. See supra notes 33-
56 and accompanying text. Had this case arisen in the United States, however, it is fair to ask
whether Qimron would have been entitled to claim the status of a joint author in light of that
doctrine's application in this country.
105. "Author-Stories" supra note 3, at 44 ("Unable to negotiate reasonable terms and left with no
legal recourse, such authors find themselves in a very disappointing and degrading position.").
Significantly, Lynn Thomson failed to require Jonathan Larson to enter into a contract because she
did not know he was going to die, and she "trusted his decency." Id. at 54 (quoting Lynn Thomson).
106. 863 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1988), affd, 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
107. Of particular concern to the court were the defendants' contributions in making the
derivative work a success. Furthermore, the court was concerned that an injunction would prevent
the legitimate use of the "new matter" that the defendants had contributed to the work, and would
prevent the public from enjoying a classic film for many years. Because of these concerns as well as
the plaintiff's failure to show irreparable injury, the court decided not to grant an injunction as was
requested by Abend, noting that section 502(a) makes injunctive relief permissive rather than
mandatory upon a of finding infringement. See Abend, 863 F.2d at 1479. The U.S. Supreme Court
ultimately affirmed the merits of the Ninth Circuit's decision regarding the issue of infringement, but
the Court explicitly noted that certiorari was not granted on the issue of relief and it did not discuss
the lower court's decision in that regard. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 216 (1990).
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As an alternative to copyright law, plaintiffs have attempted to invoke
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act to safeguard their attribution rights. The
predicate of a section 43(a) action is that the defendant has misled the
public, thereby causing consumer confusion. As will be discussed more
fully below, courts differ significantly in their approaches to section
43(a) cases involving false attributions of authorship. This judicial
inconsistency, as well as the very limitations inherent in the scope of
section 43(a), demonstrate the relative unsuitability of this provision as a
substitute for a statute recognizing an explicit right of attribution.
II. THE RIGHT OF ATTRIBUTION AND SECTION 43(A) OF THE
LANHAM ACT
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides a federal remedy for the use
of either a "false designation of origin" or a false description or
representation in connection with any goods or services.'08 Section 43(a)
was enacted to codify the common law trademark doctrine of "passing
off," the representation of the defendant's goods as those of the
plaintiff."9 However, the common law did not prohibit "reverse passing
off," the representation of the plaintiffs goods as those of the
defendant."0
Express reverse passing off occurs when the defendant removes the
name or trademark on another party's product and sells that product
under a name chosen by the defendant."' Reverse passing off also can be
implicit in operation, such as when a defendant removes the name of the
plaintiff and sells the product in an unbranded state."' The case law
involving reverse passing off shows that considerable conflict exists as to
what test should be used for proving a false designation of origin, and
whether consumer confusion is a distinct element of reverse passing off.
108. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000). I have discussed elsewhere the use of section 43(a) to redress
moral rights violations generally, without specific focus on reverse passing off. See, e.g., "Author-
Stories", supra note 3, at 30-32; Moral Rights for University Employees, supra note 13.
109. Historically, passing off was essential for proving common law unfair competition. See
generally Am. Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281 (6th Cir. 1900). Early
interpretations of section 43(a) simply continued this theme. See generally L'Aiglon Apparel v. Lana
Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954) (allowing plaintiff's recovery under section 43(a) where
the defendant used a picture of the plaintiff's dress to market its dress of allegedly poorer quality).
110. Lori H. Freedman, Reverse Passing Off. A Great Deal of Confusion, 83 TRADEMARK REP.
305,307 (1993).
111. Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 604 (9th Cir. 1981).
112. Id. at 605.
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In 1976, a federal district court in Pennsylvania became the first to
hold that section 43(a) should be applied to reverse passing off in
addition to passing off, supporting its reasoning with the argument that a
misbranded product always constitutes a false designation of origin."3
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit applied section 43(a) to a case involving
a mislabeled motion picture, "' rather than the sale of a traditional
product or good, and thus paved the way for the application of section
43(a) to reverse passing off cases involving intellectual property. When
the product at issue in a particular reverse passing off case constitutes
copyrightable subject matter such as art, literature, or music, the inquiry
is especially complicated because courts must balance the policies of
section 43 (a) against those of copyright infringement."'
The discussion below illustrates that the following two factual
scenarios can implicate both reverse passing off and copyright
infringement: first, when the defendant duplicates completely the
plaintiffs material; and second, when the defendant does not replicate
the plaintiff s work in its entirety but instead creates a work similar to the
plaintiffs. 116 Courts are conflicted about the extent to which these
scenarios give rise to a claim for violating section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act.' 7
The following sections examine more fully the application of reverse
passing off as the doctrine pertains to copyrightable works. The first
section analyzes cases in which reverse passing off claims are limited to
cases involving bodily appropriation of the plaintiff's material by the
defendant. The second section explores cases invoking a less rigorous
standard that expressly sanctions reverse passing off when a copied work
is "substantially similar" to its source. The third section discusses cases
applying a standard similar to that invoked in cases addressing whether a
state law should be preempted by section 301(a) of the 1976 Copyright
Act. In these cases, the focus is on whether the section 43(a) claim
113. John Wright Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (holding that defendant
violated Lanham Act by using a confusingly similar certificate to that of the plaintiffs and by
advertising that defendant's good was a copy of the good produced by the plaintiff).
114. Montoro, 648 F.2d at 602. See infra notes 118-123 and accompanying text.
115. Cf. Carrol v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 3 F.R.D. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (pre-Lanham Act case
disclosing libel as the basis for plaintiffs suit, a well established producer, against a defendant for
producing and exhibiting an inferior movie with authorship attributed to the plaintiff).
116. Freedman, supra note 110, at 315.
117. Id. See, e.g., notes 140-152 and accompanying text.
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explicitly embodies an "extra element" that is qualitatively different from
that of copyright law.
A. The Bodily Appropriation Test
The law in the Ninth Circuit reflects the most restrictive view
regarding whether plaintiffs can rely on section 43(a) to litigate reverse
passing off cases involving copyrightable material. In Smith v.
Montoro," the plaintiff actor alleged that defendant film distributors, in
the screen credits and film advertising, deleted his name and substituted
that of another actor's. Although the plaintiff did not sue for copyright
infringement, he did bring several other causes of action, including one
predicated on section 43(a)." 9 Reversing the lower court's dismissal of
the section 43(a) claim, the Ninth Circuit rejected the defendants'
argument that the Lanham Act's protections are limited to "sales of
goods."'2 Interestingly, the court justified its ruling with a combination
of rationales. The Ninth Circuit emphasized a property-based rationale
by noting that express reverse passing off is "wrongful because it
involves an attempt to misappropriate or profit from another's talents and
workmanship." "2 The court invoked a related rationale, stressing the
economic loss derived from the deprivation of a right to the advertising
value of one's name and goodwill." Additionally, the court utilized a
consumer-oriented rationale to the extent it focused on inadequate
consumer knowledge, consumer deception, and disappointed
expectations." Tellingly absent from the Ninth Circuit's calculus was
the invocation of a rationale that explicitly recognized the personality
and dignity interests of authors.
Although Smith was forward-looking in terms of applying section
43(a) in a reverse passing off case concerning unconventional subject
matter, Smith involved conduct on the part of the defendant that
118. 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981).
119. The plaintiff also sued the defendants based on breach of contract, "false light publicity,"
and violation of California's statute "regarding commercial appropriation of a person's likeness." Id.
at 603.
120. Id. at 605.
121. Id. at 607.
122. Id. ("Since actors' fees for pictures, and indeed, their ability to get any work at all, is often
based on the drawing power their name may be expected to have at the box office, being accurately
credited for films in which they have played would seem to be of critical importance in enabling




amounted to relabeling. In contrast, nearly ten years later, the Ninth
Circuit in Shaw v. Lindheim 24 was faced with a case in which the
defendant television script writer authored a pilot allegedly derived from
the plaintiffs, with resulting substantial similarity. The court reversed
the lower court's finding that no substantial similarity existed between
the two works for purposes of applying copyright infringement law.'
Consequently, this conclusion necessitated a determination whether a
section 43(a) Lanham Act claim can be sustained when the defendant's
work is derived from the plaintiffs, and the two works are deemed
"substantially similar." Noting the Lanham Act's objective of preventing
individuals from misleading the public "by placing their competitors'
work forward as their own," the Ninth Circuit held that minimal
likelihood of consumer confusion existed under the facts of the case.
Therefore, copyright law served as an adequate remedy, according to the
court. 1
26
Underlying the Ninth Circuit's reasoning appears to be the view that,
in the context of reverse passing off, only those false designations of
works that are "bodily appropriations" of the originals cause consumer
confusion.'27 In contrast, as the following subsection demonstrates, the
approach taken by the Second and other circuits allows greater latitude in
applying section 43(a) to reverse passing off cases involving
copyrightable property to the extent that these courts also apply section
43(a) when the works at issue are substantially similar. This subsection
discloses, however, that this degree of latitude triggers a much more
complicated analysis.
B. The Substantial Similarity Test
In Waldman Publishing Corp. v. Landoll, Inc.,2 8 the Second Circuit
announced its position that section 43(a) can be invoked in actions
involving copyrightable property, even where the defendant's materials
are "substantially similar" to the plaintiffs rather than "bodily
appropriations." The plaintiff in Waldman originally did not sue for
124. 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990).
125. Id. at 1363-64. Specifically, the court reversed the entry of summary judgment for the
defendant on the copyright claim on the ground that the plaintiff produced a triable issue of fact
under the extrinsic component of the test for copyright infringement.
126. Id. at 1364-65.
127. See Waldman Pub. Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 784 (2d Cir. 1994).
128. 43 F.3d 775 (2d Cir. 1994)-
1006
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copyright infringement because at the time the plaintiff sought
preliminary injunctive relief, it had not yet registered its copyright. 29 In
addressing reverse passing off in the context of written works, the court
observed that section 43(a) prohibits not only the sale of relabeled works
with false information, but also "the reproduction of a work with a false
representation as to its creator."' 30 Indeed, the Second Circuit explicitly
noted that "[f]alse designation of origin, as applied to written work, deals
with false designation of the creator of the work; the "origin" of the work
is its author."'
131
The Second Circuit explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit's position that
only "bodily appropriations" of written works can constitute "false
designations of origin," 132 because the Ninth Circuit based this view on
the faulty assumption that only bodily appropriations are likely to give
rise to consumer confusion. According to the Waldman court, the issue
of whether the defendant's conduct gives rise to a "false designation of
origin" is separate from whether the defendant's conduct will cause
consumer confusion.' In discussing whether the defendant's failure to
credit the plaintiff constitutes a false designation of origin under section
43(a), the Second Circuit endorsed the district court's application of the
"substantial similarity" standard used in copyright infringement
analysis.'34
Although the Second Circuit in Waldman evidenced a greater
willingness to vindicate authors' interests by interpreting section 43(a)
more broadly than the Ninth Circuit, ultimately the court based its
interpretation of section 43(a) on the need to prevent consumer
confusion, rather than the need to safeguard authors' personality
interests.'35 Subsequently, courts both in and outside 3 6 of the Second
129. Id. at 781, 785-86 (noting that since the plaintiff subsequently has registered its copyright, it
could amend its complaint to include a copyright infringement count, and on remand, the district
court could address the copyright issue and decide whether the defendant can reproduce the plaintiffs
books "at all").
130. Id. at 781 (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 783. In fact, the Second Circuit was unable to discern, from the record, whether the
plaintiff should be deemed the author of the books in question as a result of the work for hire
doctrine, and therefore remanded this issue to the district court. Id. at 784.
132. Id. at 781,784 ("We see no reason for such a bright-line rule.")
133. Id. at 781.
134. Id. at 783.
135. See id. at 784 ("[C]onsumers are likely to be confused by [defendant's) misrepresentation as
to the source of its books, even though the [defendant's] books are 'substantially similar' to but not
'bodily appropriations' of the [plaintiff's] books.").
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Circuit have embraced Waldman's position that section 43(a) should be
applied to reverse passing off cases where substantial similarity exists,
although many of these cases reveal inconsistencies and difficulties in
the application of this theory.137 As is explained more fully below, these
problematic applications exist because even those courts that are inclined
to follow Waldman and apply section 43(a) to safeguard authors'
attribution interests are invoking section 43(a) in the context of a
theoretical framework that is ill-suited for redressing personality, rather
than economic, interests.
In those cases involving relabeling, or the direct use of the plaintiffs
work without appropriate authorship attribution, courts seem somewhat
more inclined, in both theory and practice, to differentiate between
copyright and section 43(a) so that both causes of action can be
sustained. A particularly straight-forward case from the Sixth Circuit,
Johnson v. Jones,3 ' involved the direct copying of plaintiff architect's
floor plans, and the relabeling of other drawings and site plans. The court
affirmed the copyright count'39 and readily sustained the section 43(a)
claim on the ground that the removal of the plaintiffs name and
substitution of the defendant's demonstrated an "obvious and imminent
likelihood of confusion."'
' 40
In cases where the defendant's work is "derived" from the plaintiff s,
as opposed to where the defendant's conduct amounts to relabeling, the
analysis typically is more complex. A few years after Johnson v. Jones, a
district court in the Sixth Circuit grappled with a reverse passing off case
based on the defendant's alleged use and misappropriation of plaintiffs
poster. In Dahlen v. Michigan Licensed Beverage Ass'n,"4' the defendant
136. See. e.g., Dahlen v. Mich. Licensed Beverage Ass'n, 132 F. Supp. 2d 574 (E.D. Mich. 2001);
Campbell v. Osmond, 917 F. Supp. 1574 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
137. See infra notes 141-165 and accompanying text.
138. 149 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 1998).
139. It was undisputed that the plaintiff's copyright was valid, and that there was no written
instrument transferring ownership. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's determination that
the plaintiff did not grant the defendant an implied non-exclusive license to use the plaintiff's works.
Id. at 500, 502.
140. Id. at 503. In certain instances, though, courts have denied section 43(a) claims when they
are convinced there is no basis for consumer confusion. For example, in Agee v. Paramount
Communications, Inc., 59 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 1995), the plaintiff sued Paramount for incorporating a
copyrighted sound recording into the soundtrack of a taped television show. The court found that the
defendant committed copyright infringement by violating plaintiff's exclusive right of reproduction,
but dismissed the section 43(a) because the plaintiff did not allege public confusion deriving from
defendant's use of the sound recording without attribution. Id. at 319, 327.
141. 132 F. Supp. 2d 574 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
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created its own poster for economic reasons, rather than purchase the
right to use the plaintiffs. The plaintiff sued for violations of both
copyright law and section 43(a). The court noted that although the
respective posters contained similar features, they were not identical.1
42
In discussing the copyright infringement count in the context of a
summary judgment motion, the court declined to rule on the substantial
similarity of the works and left this issue for the trier of fact.143
Similarly, the Dahlen court refused to concede the substantial
similarity of the works for purposes of applying the relevant legal
standard under section 43(a). The Dahlen court invoked the framework
for reverse passing off adopted by the Second Circuit in Waldman
Publishing Corp., 4 wherein the issues of consumer confusion and false
designation are analyzed as separate requirements to sustain the section
43(a) claim. 45 The court in Dahlen observed that it will be more difficult
for a plaintiff to establish likelihood of confusion where the works in
question are substantially similar rather than virtually identical.'46
The Dahlen court nevertheless was concerned that in a reverse passing
off action involving copyrighted property, a section 43(a) claim might be
redundant of a copyright law count. To avoid this possibility, the Dahlen
court expressly endorsed the Second Circuit's requirement that a plaintiff
seeking to rely on section 43(a) must establish an "extra element," that is,
"proof of some 'affirmative act' through which the defendant falsely
represents itself as the originator of the work in question."'47 In Dahlen,
the court concluded that the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence of
"affirmative acts" of misrepresentation by virtue of the defendant's
replacement of plaintiffs copyright notice with its own logo, its
statement in its poster that the information contained in the poster was
derived from the defendant, and its dissemination of the poster without
any attribution of authorship to the plaintiff. 45 Notwithstanding the
plaintiffs satisfaction of the false designation of origin requirement, the
court declined to grant the plaintiff summary judgment on the section
43(a) claim in light of its prior ruling that it could not determine whether
142. Id. at 577.
143. Id. at 585.
144. 43 F.3d 775 (2d Cir. 1994). See supra notes 128-134 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
146. 132 F. Supp. 2d at 590.
147. Id. See infra notes 158-166 and accompanying text.
148. Dahlen, 132 F. Supp. at 590. The court also noted that it could be "inferred" that "these
actions created consumer confusion." Id. at 591.
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the plaintiffs and defendants' works were "substantially similar" as a
matter of law.'49
The approach used in Dahlen is problematic because it requires courts
to make a determination as to what types of actions constitute sufficient
"additional elements" to meet the false designation of origin requirement.
There seems to be much confusion surrounding this issue, particularly in
the Second Circuit."' This confusion is exacerbated by the fact that many
of the cases arise in the context of preliminary injunctions, summary
judgment motions, or motions to dismiss, and therefore it is difficult to
derive precise guidance on what plaintiffs must prove to prevail
ultimately on a section 43(a) claim in these circumstances.' s'
In one of the earliest derivation cases to support a section 43(a) cause
of action in this context, Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment
Co.,' the Second Circuit sustained the plaintiffs section 43(a) claim
based on the defendant's manufacture of a nightshirt featuring a print of
a bear found "identical in almost all respects" to one of the plaintiff's
drawings of its own bear. 3 The defendant's nightshirt bore the legend
"© Fred Original."154 In granting summary judgment in the plaintiffs
favor on the section 43(a) claim, the district court noted that "[t]here is
no doubt about the falsity of Florelee's copyright notice," and that this
deception "can mislead consumers into believing that the clothing they
purchased is a unique novelty instead of a common copy.'7
55
The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment based on the consumer
deception rationale that false and misleading claims about the
defendant's own products are actionable under section 43(a). In this case,
Florelee's claim of originality clearly concerned its own product.
149. Id. at 591-92.
150. See infra discussion of Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.
1982) and Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464,473-74 (2d Cir. 1995).
151. See, e.g., Lipton, 71 F.3d at 473-74 (reversing summary judgment for plaintiff on section
43(a) claim); Dahlen v. Mich. Licensed Beverage Ass'n, 132 F. Supp. 2d 574, 588-92 (E.D. Mich.
2001) (denying both sides' motion for summary judgment on section 43(a) claim); Scholastic, Inc. v.
Stouffer, 124 F. Supp. 2d 836, 843-45 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (concluding that plaintiff's section 43(a)
claim survives motion to dismiss); Campbell v. Osmond, 917 F. Supp. 1574, 1581-83 (M.D. Fla.
1996) (denying parties' summary judgment motion and holding that the issue of "substantial
similarity" should be decided by the trier of fact).
152. 697 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1982).
153. Id. at 31.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 37.
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Moreover, the plaintiff also sued for copyright infringement,5 ' but the
Second Circuit failed to address why copyright law does not provide an
exclusive, adequate avenue for the plaintiff. Subsequent decisions
became more attuned to this question. In general, more recent cases
appear to have somewhat greater difficulty sustaining section 43(a)
claims in situations where the defendant's product is derived from the
plaintiff's, rather than where the defendant merely "relabels" the
plaintiff s product.'57
156. The Second Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's copyright
infringement claim, and remanded this cause of action. Id.
157. Consider, for example, United States Media Corp. v. Edde Entertainment Inc., 40
U.S.P.Q.2d 1581 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), a relabeling case in which the defendants had obtained
unauthorized copies of plaintiff's films, reproduced them and distributed them to retailers. The court
granted the plaintiff a partial summary judgment on its copyright and section 43(a) claims. Id. at
1583-84. Noting that although copyright infringement, without more, does not support a false
designation of origin, additional acts by the infringer can substantiate a section 43(a) claim.
Examples of such additional acts include the infringer's false representation of itself as the owner of
the work, or a "significant discrepancy between the contribution of the authors listed and the credit
that they are given." Id. at 1588. Where such a discrepancy exists, consumer confusion regarding the
origin of the work will result in a "false designation of origin" within the meaning of section 43(a).
Id. at 1589. Some other cases also involving conduct on the part of the defendant amounting to direct
use or reproduction of the plaintiff's work absent appropriate attribution also conclude, without
much of a struggle, that a section 43(a) claim can be sustained in these circumstances. In Carell v.
Shubert Org., Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), the defendants published press releases
and produced a video version of the play Cats in which credit for the makeup designs was given to
someone other than the plaintiff makeup designer. In sustaining the section 43(a) claim on a motion
to dismiss, the court focused on the plaintiff's allegations of affirmative misrepresentations of
owership. According to the court, these allegations precluded the section 43(a) claim frotn being
considered duplicative of her claim for copyright infringement. Id. at 262. Similarly, in Richard
Feiner & Co. v. Harmon Pictures Corp., 38 F. Supp. 2d 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), the owner of the
copyrights to Laurel and Hardy motion pictures and the still photographic images derived from them
sued the ovmer of the rights in the personas of Laurel and Hardy. The basis of the suit was the
defendant's sale and distribution of Laurel and Hardy's images from the movies, with the copyrights
wrongly attributed to the defendant. The court held that the plaintiff had stated claims under both the
copyright statute and section 43(a).
In contrast, in Armstrong v. Virgin Records, Ltd., 91 F. Supp. 2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant's recording contained an infringing sample of his composition, and that
the defendant failed to give attribution credit to the plaintiff. In dismissing the section 43(a) claim,
the court observed that the plaintiff's Lanham Act claim was duplicative of his copyright claim.
False originality, according to the court, "does not venture beyond that implicit in any allegedly false
copyright." Id. at 633. Although Armstrong thus would appear to be inconsistent with those
relabelling cases that typically sustain a section 43(a) count with the copyright claim, perhaps an
argument can be made that the digital sampling process so alters the original work that sampling is
more similar to a situation where the defendant's work is "derived" from the plaintiff, rather than
one involving "relabelling." See Houle, Digital Audio Sampling, Copyright Law and The American
Music Industry: Piracy or Just a Bad "Rap," 37 LOy. L REV. 879, 880 (1992) ("Digital sound
sampling has been used as a technique to isolate distinctive vocal and instrumental sounds. Once
isolated, these sounds may be recorded and analyzed. In fact, the process allows the digital sampler
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More than ten years after the Second Circuit decided Eden, the court
issued an opinion declaring that the existence of a false copyright notice,
by itself, is insufficient as a matter of law to support a section 43(a)
claim based on a false designation of origin. In Lipton v. Nature Co.,'
the defendant Wein allegedly infringed the copyright in a compilation of
animal terms that was contained in plaintiff's books. Wein applied for a
copyright registration of the compilation, asserting that he was the
originator of the work, had manufactured posters of the compilation, and
had licensed the right to use the compilation on a variety of products.
One of the licensees, defendant Nature, marketed a poster of the
compilation with copyright notices in the names of both defendants. 9
The district court found in favor of the plaintiff on both the copyright
infringement and section 43(a) counts, holding that the copyright notices
on the poster are "false designations of origin," constituting false claims
of originality under section 43(a).
The Second Circuit sustained the copyright infringement claim, but
reversed on the section 43(a) count, holding that "as a matter of law, a
false copyright notice alone cannot constitute a false designation of
origin within the meaning of section 43(a)."'60 The court reconciled its
decision with Waldman 6 by indicating that the reproduction of a work
with a false representation as to its creator might support a section 43(a)
claim, and with Eden by indicating that there, the defendant "also made
the additional representation that the product was 'original.""2
6 2
The Second Circuit in Lipton noted that there were "striking
similarities" between the plaintiffs compilation and the defendants'
to create a new song. The digital sampler can then play back a song comprised of another artist's
sounds but never actually executed by the original musician."). See also Marvullo v. Gruner & Jahr.,
105 F. Supp. 2d 225, 232-33 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding magazine's publication of photograph
without crediting photographer does not amount to false representation by publisher that it was the
creator or owner of the photographs; court therefore dismissed section 43(a) claim as legally
insufficient because it did nothing more than embody a false claim of originality implicit in any false
copyright).
158. 71 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995).
159. Id. at 468. Two copyright notices appeared on Nature's poster. One was in Wein's name for
the compilation, and the other was in Nature's name. Id. at 469.
160. Id. at 473.
161. See supra notes 128-134 and accompanying text.
162. Lipton, 71 F.3d at 473-74. See also Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 710-711 (2d
Cir. 1991) (noting that to the extent a false copyright notice does no more than support a copyright
infringement claim, it must be rejected as nothing more than an attempt to convert a copyright
infringement action into a Lanham Act violation).
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works. 163 Therefore, perhaps Lipton should be viewed as a "bodily
appropriation" case rather than one involving "substantial similarity." If
so, the court should have been more, rather than less, likely to sustain the
section 43(a) count on the grounid that a bodily appropriation is more
likely to cause consumer confusion and unjust enrichment.'6 Lipton, by
distinguishing false copyright notices on the one hand, and false claims
of originality and false representations as to the work's creator on the
other, draws an arbitrary and unconvincing distinction. 165 Other cases
sustain a false designation of origin claim under section 43(a) when the
defendant's conduct involves a misrepresentation as to the ownership of
the copyrighted work in question.166
In theory, a copyright notice may suggest nothing more than the
representation that one in whose name the copyright notice appears has
the right to reproduce the copyrighted work. For example, a licensee's
use of a copyright notice, without more, does not necessarily imply that
the licensee is the creator, originator, or even the owner of the
copyrighted work. The reality, however, is that most lay people do not
think about such fine distinctions when confronted with a copyright
notice. It is simply natural for people to assume that the purported
copyright owner is the same entity as the creator, originator, or owner of
the work.
The theory implicit in Lipton and those cases invoking its rationale is
that a defendant who reproduces the copyrighted work without
permission is liable for copyright infringement, but an additional type of
misrepresentation is necessary in order to mandate liability under section
43(a) based on a "false designation of origin." 167 This additional
163. Lipton, 71 F.3d at 471-72.
164. See supra notes 124-127 and accompanying text
165. Cf. Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282, 1298 (1lth Cir. 1999) (citing cases critical of
Lipton's conclusion that a false copyright notice cannot constitute a false designation of origin under
section 43(a)).
166. See id. at 1299 (sustaining section 43(a) claim on the ground that defendants also stated a
false claim of"ownership" of the work in question); United States Media Corp. v. Edde Entm't Inc.,
40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1581 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), discussed supra in note 157.
167. See, eg., BanffLtd. v. Express, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (plaintiffdid not
establish a false designation of origin claim under section 43(a) by proving that defendant retailer
placed its label on knockoff of plaintiff's sweater; court reasoned that the defendant was merely
representing that it had the "right to sell" the sweaters, not that it had created the sweaters); Kerr v.
New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that by itself, a false
copyright notice cannot support a false designation claim under section 43(a)). Cf. Scholastic, Inc., v.
Stouffer, 124 F. Supp. 2d 836, 844-45 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that section 43(a) claim is not
duplicative of copyright claim where pleading includes affirmative misrepresentation of trademark
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misrepresentation occurs if the defendant falsely implies that he is the
originator, creator, or the owner of the copyrighted work. Whereas
Lipton implicitly requires an additional type of misrepresentation to
sustain liability under section 43(a), other courts explicitly require a
showing of additional misrepresentation in this context based on an
analogy to the analytical framework invoked under section 301(a), the
preemption provision of the 1976 Copyright Act. The following
subsection examines this line of cases.
C. The Section 301(a) Paradigm
The analysis of courts invoking the "substantial similarity" test under
section 43(a) often mirrors, in application, a conventional preemption
analysis under section 301(a) of the 1976 Act. As discussed in the
foregoing section, courts inclined to sustain a section 43(a) violation in
the context of reverse passing off cases involving copyrightable property
typically conclude that "an aggrieved author must show more than a
violation of the author's copyright-protected right to credit and profit
from a creation."168 In fact, at least one district court applying this
standard has recognized explicitly that "[t]his rule is analogous to the
preemption rule that a state law claim requires an 'extra element,'
beyond those tracing to any copyright," so that the nature of the section
43(a) action is "qualitatively different" from a cause of action based on
copyright infringement.'69
Section 301 of the Copyright Act sets forth an express test for
determining whether a particular state law is preempted by the 1976 Act.
The test under section 301 has two parts. The first part of the preemption
test focuses on the nature of the work protected by the state law.
Specifically, preemption will not occur if the state law does not pertain to
"works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression
and come within the subject matter of copyright."'7 ° The states, in other
ownership, through promotion and sale of various products and services including copyrighted
books with allegedly false designations of origin). But see Marling v. Ellison, 218 U.S.P.Q. 702, 714
(S.D. Fla. 1982) (holding that defendant violated section 43(a) by misappropriating plaintiffs'
copyrighted material without acknowledging plaintiffs' ownership rights).
168. Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 458,463 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
169. Id. at 464.
170. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000).
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words, are free to regulate all works that are not protected by the
copyright law because of their nature or form of expression.'7 '
The second part of the preemption test emphasizes the nature of the
rights that the state law attempts to safeguard. If the state seeks to protect
rights that are "not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright," the state's law will not be preempted by
section 301. '7' The application of the equivalency prong of the
preemption test thus requires a determination whether a particular state
law creates rights that are "equivalent" to any of the rights protected by
section 106 of the Act.173 The 1976 Act does not define the term
"equivalent," but the legislative history indicates that a state cause of
action will not be preempted if it contains elements that are "different in
kind" from copyright infringement. 74
In applying this standard, most courts have followed the late Professor
Nimmer's suggestion that an "equivalent" right is one which "is
infringed by the mere act of reproduction, performance, distribution or
display."'75 Essentially, this approach requires an analysis of the state
law in question to determine what acts will constitute an infringement. If
the exercise of one or more of the specific rights protected by federal
copyright law is all that is necessary to constitute an infringement of the
state law, preemption will occur. If other elements also are required to
infringe the state law, no preemption will result.176
Significantly, Congress confined the preemption application of section
301(a) to state laws. The legislative history clearly states that "there is no
intention to deal with the question of whether Congress can or shiould
offer the equivalent of copyright protection under some constitutional
provision other than the patent-copyright clause of article I, section 8.'7'
171. "Ifa particular work is capable of copyright protection but is not fixed in a tangible medium
of expression, protection may be obtained under state common law copyright." ROCHELLE COOPER
DREYFUSS & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAW 521 (Foundation Press 1996).
172. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3) (2000).
173. Id. The rights safeguarded by section 106 under copyright law include the rights to
reproduce, distribute, publicly perform, publicly display, and make derivative works of the
copyrighted work. Id. § 106. Note that preemption of a state law will occur only if both parts of the
test in section 301(a) are met. DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 171, at 521.
174. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476,109, at 132,reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,5748.
175. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][1], at 1-12
(2002).
176. DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 171, at 545.
177. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 5746.
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Subsection (d) of section 301 expressly states that "nothing contained in
[Title 17] annuls or limits any rights or remedies under any other Federal
statute."' 78 Thus, by virtue of the statute's express terms, Congress did
not intend the section 301(a) analysis to govern situations where
plaintiffs are invoking section 43(a), a federal provision, to obtain a
remedy for reverse passing off when the subject matter at issue is
copyrightable property. Even so, some courts, particularly district courts
in the Seventh Circuit, have expressly relied on the section 301(a)
paradigm to decide cases involving this issue.
LaCour v. Time Warner, Inc., ' an unpublished opinion, is
representative of these district court opinions. LaCour involved a song
initially recorded by the defendant which became the inspirational theme
song for the movie Space Jam.8 ' Several years after the song's initial
recording by the defendant, plaintiff LaCour alleged that he was the
song's sole and original author, and sued the defendant for copyright
infringement, and violations of section 43(a) and state unfair competition
law. In LaCour's complaint, he alleged that the defendant's version of
the song was derived from, and substantially similar to, the plaintiffs
version, and that the defendant made false and misleading
representations to the public by claiming authorship of the song.
LaCour concerns exclusively the question of whether the federal and
state unfair competition causes of action are preempted by section 301 (a)
of the copyright statute. The court noted that in addressing the question
of whether copyright law limits a plaintiff's right to relief under section
43(a); district courts in the Seventh Circuit have not relied on either the
"bodily appropriation" or "substantial similarity" tests. 81 Instead, the
district courts have compared a reverse passing off claim under section
43(a) to a reverse passing off claim under state unfair competition law,
based on the theory that the requisite elements for both causes of action
are the same. 182 Specifically, both state unfair competition law and
section 43(a) causes of action are grounded in the identical objectives of
protecting consumers from confusion and deception. Such congruence
justifies applying the section 301(a) preemption analysis that governs
178. 17 U.S.C. § 301(d) (2000).
179. 2000 WL 688946 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
180. The title of the song is IBelieve I Can Fly.
181. 2000 WL 688946 at *5.
182. See, &g., Tensor Group, Inc. v. Global Web Sys., Inc., 1999 WL 617818, *3 (N.D. Ill. 1999);
Goes Lithography Co. v. Banta Corp., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1047 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
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state unfair competition law reverse passing off claims to section 43(a)
claims involving reverse passing off.'83
Thus, as LaCour illustrates, district courts in the Seventh Circuit
eschew the "bodily appropriation" and "substantial similarity"
approaches endorsed elsewhere in favor of an explicit adoption of the
section 301(a) framework. 184 Moreover, in determining what types of
allegations would render a state law claim "qualitatively different" from
one based on copyright infringement, LaCour suggests that a plaintiff
must allege affirmative misrepresentations about the origin of the work.
Such affirmative misrepresentations are in contrast to the inherent
misrepresentations that otherwise accompany the unauthorized copying
and reproduction of another's copyrighted work in a reverse passing off
case.
85
In LaCour, the court held that the plaintiff had not made this showing
because the essence of his complaint was the defendant's sale and
representation of the song as his own work. As such, the plaintiff's
complaint amounted to nothing more that an assertion of the defendant's
"violation of the reproduction and derivative rights protected by the
copyright law.' 86 Of course, given that LaCour involved a motion to
dismiss rather than a complete trial on the merits, the case provides little
guidance regarding what type of allegations would meet the court's
articulated standard of "affirmative misrepresentations about the origin
of the work." '' This procedural characteristic and consequent vague
direction is representative of most other district court opinions in the
Seventh Circuit, both those treating preemption in the context of section
43(a) as well as state unfair competition law. One court, in fact, has gone
so far as to broadly suggest that "relief under the Lanham Act is
redundant and unnecessary when a product allegedly is copyrighted,"
183. LaCour, 2000 WL 688946, at *5. In addition to violation of section 43(a), LaCour's
complaint alleged violations of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and the
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
184. See also Natkin v. Winfrey, Il1 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1012-13 (N.D. Ill. 2000). Cf. Debs v.
Meliopoulos, 1993 WL 566011, *12 (N.D. Ga.) (disputing any requirement of "bodily
appropriation" or "substantial similarity" contained in section 43(a) and concluding that "[a] failure
to attribute authorship to a person ... constitutes a violation of section 43(a) so long as findings of
falsity and likelihood of confusion are made").





although the case dismissing the plaintiffs complaint contains no
analysis of this sweeping point.88
One of the seminal Seventh Circuit district court decisions
establishing the preemption analysis relevant for state unfair competition
actions involving copyrighted property is FASA Corp. v. Playmates Toys,
Inc.' 9 There, plaintiff FASA, a designer of certain futuristic games, sued
a toy manufacturer for copying certain designs elements of its game. In
the portion of the opinion discussing the reverse passing off claim based
on state unfair competition law, the FASA court held that the claim was
preempted based, in part, on the reasoning of the district court's decision
in Waldman Publishing Corp. v. Landoll, Inc. 90 In Waldman, the district
court held the plaintiffs common law claims were preempted by section
301(a), and this portion of the order was not appealed to the Second
Circuit. 191 Yet, the Second Circuit in Waldman, as discussed in
Subsection B, sustained a section 43(a) claim in the context of
copyrightable subject matter, concluding that a false designation of
written work extends to indicating falsely the "origin" of the work as its
author.'92 Thus, Waldman implicitly drew a distinction between state
unfair competition actions based on reverse passing off, and those
predicated on section 43(a). Moreover, the Second Circuit in Waldman
explicitly recognized that, as applied to a copyrightable work, the "false
designation of origin" component of a section 43(a) action "deals with
false designation of the creator of the work."' 93
The court in FASA, though relying upon the district court decision in
Waldman, did not have the benefit of the Second Circuit's Waldman
opinion when it rendered its decision. "' In FASA, the defendant's
misrepresentation consisted of selling the allegedly infringing works
188. Tensor Group, Inc. v. Global Web Systems, Inc., 1999 WL 617818, *3 (N.D. Ill.)
189. 869 F. Supp. 1334 (N.D. Ii. 1994).
190. 848 F. Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
191. Waldman Publishing Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 779 n.3 (2d Cir. 1994).
Interestingly, prior to the lower court's decision in Waldman, at least one district court in the Second
Circuit explicitly held that a state law unfair competition claim based on reverse passing off is not
equivalent to copyright in light of the additional element of misrepresentation or deception. Tracy v.
Skate Key, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 748, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
192. Waldman, 43 F.3d at 783. In fact, the Second Circuit was unable to discem, from the record,
whether the plaintiff should be deemed the author of the books in question as a result of the work for
hire doctrine, and therefore remanded this issue to the district court. Id. at 784.
193. 1d. at783.
194. The Second Circuit opinion in Waldman was decided on December 22, 1994; FASA was
decided on December 5, 1994.
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under its own label, rather than that of the plaintiffs. In this regard, the
court in FASA observed: "[V]irtually every copyright infringement claim
inherently involves this minimal degree of misrepresentation as to the
creator of the allegedly infringing work. To permit state law claims to go
forward under this theory of misrepresentation would effectively render
the Copyright Act's preemption a nullity."'9 5 Yet, only a few weeks after
FASA was decided, the Second Circuit in Waldman explicitly recognized
that misrepresentation as to a work's creator is exactly the sort of
conduct that allows a section 43(a) claim to be sustained in the context of
copyrightable property."
Of course, had the FASA court had available to it the Second Circuit's
opinion in Waldman, it is possible the FASA court would have
analogized the state unfair competition claim to a section 43(a) claim and
held that the misrepresentation of a work's creator is an element that
renders the state unfair competition action "qualitatively different" from
one based on copyright law. In any event, it is clear that none of the
subsequent opinions of district courts in the Seventh Circuit treating the
issue of whether state unfair competition actions based on reverse
passing off are preempted by section 301(a) have focused on this element
of Waldman.'97 Moreover, those district court opinions that subsequently
analogized state unfair competition actions to ones based on section
43(a) for purposes of deciding the preemption issue also failed to address
the implications of FASA's interpretation of Waldman.' Therefore, to
the extent district courts in the Seventh Circuit rely on FASA in holding
that reverse passing off actions based on section 43(a) are duplicative of
copyright law, their reasoning is flawed. 9
195. FASA Corp., 869 F. Supp. at 1361 (emphasis added).
196. See supra notes 128-134 and accompanying text; note 161 and accompanying text. Cf.
FASA, 869 F. Supp. at 1361 ("Accordingly, we cannot conclude that an allegation of
misrepresentation based solely on an alleged infringer's act of displaying, selling, or promoting the
infringing work as his or her own creation, is sufficient to remove a state based claim from the
preemptive reach of 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).") (emphasis added).
197. See, eg., Marobie-FI, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distrib. & NW Nexus, Inc., 983 F.
Supp. 1167, 1180 (N.D. Ill. 1997); The Balsamo/Olson Group, Inc. v. Bradley Place Ltd. P'ship, 950
F. Supp. 896, 898-99 (C.D. fI1. 1997).
198. Natkin v. Winfrey, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1012-14 (N.D. Ill. 2000); LaCour v. Time Warner,
Inc., 2000 WL 688946 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Tensor Group, Inc. v. Global Web Sys., Inc. 1999 WL
617818 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Goes Lithography Co. v. Banta Corp., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1046-47 (N.D.
ll. 1998).
199. Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit, in a much earlier opinion, recognized the breadth of
section 43(a)'s applicability in a case involving reverse passing off of copyrightable property. In
F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 214 U.S.P.Q. 409 (7th Cir. 1982), the
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D. Section 43(a)'s Failure To Protect Attribution Interests
As is true of judicial applications of copyright law, courts render
section 43(a) determinations quite apart from any consideration of the
authorial interests at stake when the right of attribution is at issue.
Indeed, one court has expressly declared that the Lanham Act does not
create a duty of attribution."0 The foregoing discussion demonstrates that
plaintiffs attempting to obtain a remedy for reverse passing off are
disserved through their forced reliance on section 43(a) to redress
violations that should properly be addressed within the scope of an
independent right of attribution. Because the requirements for proving a
case under section 43(a) are shaped largely by that doctrine's focus on
preventing consumer deception, 201 courts become preoccupied with
different manifestations of "falsity" at the expense of an author's
personality and reputational interests.2 2 An attribution violation harms
the author's spirit, and the damage to the author's spiritual interest is the
primary focus of the right of attribution. 203
As the law currently stands, this spiritual interest is capable of
protection only when damage to consumers is present.2" Even those
courts that do find in favor of a plaintiff author based on a section 43(a)
plaintiff music publisher sued the Catholic Bishop of Chicago for copyright infringement and
violation of section 43(a) based on the defendant's inserting the plaintiffs copyrighted songs in its
hymnals without the plaintiff's permission, and without attribution of authorship or copyright
ownership. Regarding the section 43(a) claim, the plaintiff alleged that by applying the name of the
parish and omitting the plaintiffs name from the hymnals, the Bishop falsely identified himself or
his parishes as the source or owner of the songs. Id. at 416. Noting that section 43(a) is a "remedial
statute that must be broadly construed," and that the issue of consumer confusion regarding the
origin of the songs must be determined at trial, the Seventh Circuit held that resolution of the section
43(a) issue could not be accomplished on a summary judgment motion. Id.
200. Morita v. Omni Publ'ns. Int'l Ltd., 741 F. Supp. 1107, 1114 (S.D.N.Y- 1990). See also
Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1260 (9th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that although the Lanham Act
"does not create a duty of express attribution, [it] does protect against misattribution").
201. Cf Campbell v. Osmond, 917 F. Supp. 1574, 1583 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (noting that damages
caused as a result of consumer confusion sustain a section 43(a) cause of action separate from
copyright infringement).
202. Cf Pesina v. Midway Mfg. Co., 948 F. Supp. 40, 43 (N.D. 111. 1996) (holding that alleged
use of plaintiffs name, likeness and persona in martial arts video does not violate the Lanham Act,
and observing that the plaintiff must show he was a celebrity in order to prove his identity
constitutes an "economic interest protectable under the Lanham Act").
203. Cf Freedman, supra note 110, at 320-23 (noting that reverse passing off presents different
harms when the plaintiff is an actor, artist or writer, as opposed to a manufacturer or producer).
204. "Author-Stories", supra note 3, at 32 (noting that in § 43(a) cases, "[t]he plaintiffs' narratives
of damage to their dignity as authors were not considered by the courts, in large part because under
the current legal system no place exists for their inclusion").
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violation recognize and safeguard the underlying damage to the author's
spirit as a secondary concern-the primary focus always is on whether
consumers are deceived through the defendant's false representations.
205
As a result of this flawed doctrinal fit between section 43(a) and reverse
passing off, only those plaintiffs who are successful in demonstrating a
certain type of misrepresentation 206 or consumer confusion 207 will
prevail."'
It is possible to unpack even more completely the ways in which
section 43(a)'s requirements of misrepresentation or consumer confusion
effectively preclude the assertion of a right of attribution in many
instances. Part I.B of this Article discussed four scenarios in which
authors were left with inadequate protection for their attribution interests
under copyright law.20 9 By virtue of the theoretical disconnect between
the right of attribution and section 43(a), certain situations also arise in
which a plaintiff author will not be able to invoke section 43(a) to protect
her attribution interest.
Initially, it is important to note that a finding of consumer confusion
requires the existence of distinct, recognizable subject matter. Although
the Lanham Act is clear that section 43(a) does not require a registered
trademark, courts invoke the same standards in determining consumer
confusion under section 43(a) that they do for determining whether
consumers are confused by a defendant's infringement of a plaintiffs
federally registered trademark.2"0 Nevertheless, section 43(a) protects
only "qualifying unregistered" subject matter, and "the general principles
205. Cf. Follett v. New Am. Library, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 304, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("Even if an
attribution of authorship were consistent with industry practices, it would nevertheless be illegal
under the Lanham Act if it misrepresented the contribution of the person designated as author.").
206. See supra notes 158-167 and accompanying text.
207. Cf. Batiste v. Island Records, Inc., 179 F.3d 217, 225 (5th Cir. 1999) (refusing to sustain a
§ 43(a) claim for reverse passing off based on defendant's use of digital sample of plaintiffs work
on the ground that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate genuine issue of likelihood of confusion); Debs v.
Meliopoulos, 1993 WL 566011, *15 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (noting that defendant may have technically
violated the Lanham Act by virtue of his failure to attribute authorship to plaintiff of a relatively
small contribution to his materials, but refusing to award relief due to lack of actual or likelihood of
confusion).
208. See Freedman, supra note 110, at 330 ("The 'likelihood of confusion' test is never
appropriate in situations where an actor, artist, or writer is not credited for her work" because "even
if there is no consumer confusion, the very fact that the creator is deprived of recognition for her
work is a personal affront and thus harmful.").
209. See supra notes 83-107 and accompanying text.
210. See DPEYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 171, at 74-75. In proving likelihood of consumer
confusion under either section 43(a) or section 1114 (trademark infringement), courts invoke a set of
factors that are remarkably consistent among the circuit courts. See id. at 75.
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qualifying a mark for registration under section 2 of the Lanham Act are
for the most part applicable in determining whether an unregistered mark
is entitled to protection under section 43(a).' To "qualify" for such
protection, a mark must be either "inherently distinctive" or have
acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning.12
If a plaintiff author's work is not sufficiently well-known to trigger
public recognition, it is questionable whether a plaintiffs act of "reverse
passing off' will spark the necessary confusion on the part of the
consuming public to support relief under section 43(a). Some courts have
alleviated this particular concern by refusing to apply the requirements of
"distinctiveness" or "secondary meaning" in reverse passing off cases.21 3
The theory underlying these decisions appears to be that in a reverse
passing off case, the very existence of the reverse passing off precludes
the true author from developing the consumer association between
herself and her work.1 4 As these cases illustrate, courts applying section
43(a) to protect an author's attribution interest are forced to manipulate
the existing commercially based section 43(a) doctrine so that it can be
applied to remedy situations where a significant harm to the plaintiff is
personal rather than economic.2 5
Partial designations of attribution also can preclude an author from
successfully relying on section 43(a) to protect her attribution interest.
The situation in Qimron v. Shanks is illustrative of this problem. As
discussed in Part IA, in that case the defendant Shanks published the
deciphered reconstructed text of one of the Dead Sea Scrolls and
attributed authorship to a particular professor working "with a
211. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992).
212. Id. at 769 (defining secondary meaning as "acquired distinctiveness"). A term acquires
secondary meaning when its primary meaning in consumers' minds is the trademark meaning.
DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 171, at 44.
213. See, e.g., Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 503 (6th Cir. 1998); Dahlen v. Mich. Licensed
Beverage Ass'n, 132 F. Supp. 2d 574, 591 (E.D. Mich. 2001); Waldman Pub. Corp. v. Landoll., Inc.,
43 F.3d 775, 784 n.7 (2d Cir. 1994); Blank v. Pollack, 916 F. Supp. 165, 170 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). See
also Dodd v. Fort Smith Special Sch. Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1278, 1285 (W.D. Ark. 1987) (noting that
the confusion presented in reverse passing off cases "is not caused by a comparison of two products
both in the public domain" but rather "is the result of the alleged false representation" of the
defendant as the author).
214. Dahlen, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 591. See also Blank, 916 F. Supp. at 170 (noting that in a reverse
passing off case, "the lack of secondary meaning is exactly what the plaintiff is alleging" because
this absence leads consumers of the subject matter in question to believe the defendants were likely
to be confused by the misrepresentation regarding the creative source of the product).
215. See supra notes 206-208 and accompanying text.
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colleague."2"6 Technically, this situation does not give rise to a "false
designation of origin" under section 43(a) because the defendant's
217representation was not untrue.
According to one commentator, the essence of a section 43(a) offense
is absent under these circumstances because Shanks "fooled no one into
thinking that one individual deserved full credit for a work in fact
authored by two."218 Instead, Shanks "honestly apprised the world that
[the work] ... had two fathers, although he listed only one by name." 9
Moreover, the argument has been made that Shanks' omission of
plaintiff's name would not give rise to consumer confusion because most
purchasers of Shanks' work would have been aware of Professor
Qimron's role, and therefore the defendant's omission would not have
subjected him to any "sensible diminution of his publicity or
notoriety."'
The facts of Qimron illustrate the disconnect between the attribution
interest and section 43(a). Had the case been litigated under American
law, it is probable that the plaintiff would have invoked section 43(a) in
light of the absence of other alternatives upon which to base an
attribution violation. Precedent does exist in this country for concluding
that the failure to mention all joint authors to a project can give rise to
liability under section 43(a), although those cases involve a complete
omission rather than a partially oblique reference to an author's
identity." Nevertheless, regardless of whether the oblique reference to
Professor Qimron was a sufficient mentioning to escape liability under
216. See supra notes 33, 53-56 and accompanying text.
217. Of course, in light of the fact that the case was decided under Israeli law, the application of
section 43(a) to the facts of Qimron v. Shanks was not at issue.
218. Nimmer, supra note 33, at 149.
219. Id.
220 Id. at 151.
221. See, e.g., Lamothe v. Atlantic Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403, 1406-08 (9th Cir. 1988)
(omission of plaintiff joint authors names in album and sheet music constitutes false designation of
origin under section 43(a)); Maurizio v. Goldsmith, 84 F. Supp. 2d 455,468 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting
that plaintiff's evidence supporting copyright joint authorship claim can be used to support her
section 43(a) claim). Cf. Waldman Pub. Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 781 (2d Cir. 1994)
("Through a Lanham Act action, an author may ensure that his or her name is associated with a work
when the work is used."). But see Cleary v. News Corporation, 30 F.3d 1255, 1260 (9th Cir. 1993)
("[Tihe case law does suggest that the Lanham Act does not create a duty of express attribution, but
does protect against misattribution."); Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 458, 464
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (dismissing plaintiff's section 43(a) claim based on defendant's failure to
acknowledge plaintiff as the co-author of copyrighted songs as "duplicative" of the copyright claim);
Morita v. Omni Publ'ns. Int'l., Ltd., 741 F. Supp. 1107, 1114 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (refusing to interpret
section 43(a) as mandating a duty of express attribution).
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section 43(a), the critical point is that both complete omissions, as well
as oblique partial references, violate the inherent right of an author to be
recognized as the source of her works. Whether the defendant's
incomplete representations are technically true, or whether they will
foster consumer confusion in the marketplace, is irrelevant to whether
the defendant has failed to recognize the plaintiff s attribution interest.2n
The interface between section 43(a) and contract law raises yet
another obstacle for authors attempting to vindicate their attribution
interests through reliance on section 43(a). Cleary v. News CorpY is
illustrative of this conflict. In that case, the plaintiff author sued the
publisher of Robert's Rules of Order for omitting his name on the title
page of a revised edition. In arguing that the publisher's conduct
constituted reverse passing off under section 43(a), the plaintiff advanced
the argument that "the Lanham Act protects an author against an
inaccurate designation of authorship despite the fact that the author
expressly contracted away the right of attribution" through a work for
hire agreement. 2 4 Ultimately, the court did not decide this particular
issue in light of its holding that even if the plaintiff did not relinquish his
right to attribution, his right was not violated under the facts of the
case.225 Although Cleary illustrates the problem, rather than the solution,
to the conflict between section 43(a) and contract law, district courts in
other circuits have concluded that actions under section 43(a) cannot be
brought when a contractual provision authorizes the defendant's
conduct. 226 This interface between section 43(a) and contract law
underscores the need for an explicit and non-waivable right of
attribution, a point discussed further in the next part.2 7
222. Cf Nimmer, supra note 33, at 148 n.728 (noting the distinction between section 43(a) and
Israeli moral rights law, which may entitle the author to a right of attribution rather than protection
only against misattribution).
223. 30 F.3d 1255 (9th Cir. 1994).
224. Id. at 1260. In Cleary, the publisher argued that because the plaintiff signed a contract
containing a work for hire agreement, it had no duty to provide him with title credit in any edition of
the work. Id. at 1259.
225. Id. at 1261.
226. See, e.g., Yahway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA Inc., 225 U.S.P.Q. 45,47-48 (N.D. Ga. 1984)
(refusing to allow suit under section 43(a) because the license contained express provisions
regarding the placement of trademarks); Wallace Computer Servs. Inc. v. Sun Microsystems Inc., 13
U.S.P.Q.2d 1324, 1328 (N.D. Il. 1989) (denying summary judgment on reverse passing off because
there was an issue of fact as to whether a license existed). See also Freedman, supra note 110, at 319
n.70 (noting possible reluctance of a federal court to provide a remedy for a matter governed by state
contract law).
227. See supra notes 250 at 94-95; American Marriage, supra note 2, at 41.
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The foregoing discussion demonstrates the difficulties with reliance
on section 43(a) as the legal doctrine through which the attribution
interest can be enforced. Similarly, copyright law as it is applied in this
country does not serve as the mechanism for safeguarding this interest.
Thus, our legal system has failed to protect the attribution interest in an
independent, and doctrinally honest, manner. As discussed in the
following part, the remedy for this situation is the adoption of an explicit
right of attribution as part of federal copyright law.
Ill. THE CASE FOR AN INDEPENDENT RIGHT OF
ATTRIBUTION
The discussion in the foregoing parts of this Article focuses on the
applicable case law in the areas of both copyright and section 43(a), and
demonstrates the inherent difficulties with applying both the copyright
and section 43(a) models to safeguard the interests protected by the right
of attribution. An author can be deprived of attribution in a variety of
circumstances even though no copyright or section 43(a) violations exist.
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is clear that the authorial interests that
are the focus of the right of attribution are protected only coincidentally
through the invocation of alternate legal theories. Thus, if the United
States truly is concerned with protecting authorial interests, it must
contemplate enacting an explicit right of attribution.
In many of the cases discussed in the foregoing parts, plaintiffs
asserted both copyright infringement and section 43(a) causes of action.
Batiste v. Island Records, Inc., 8 discussed in Part IB, is illustrative.
There, the plaintiff songwriters could not prevail on their copyright claim
because of the existence of a valid copyright assignment, and the
defendant had secured the permission of the assignee prior to the release
of the infringing album.' The plaintiffs in that case also raised a section
43(a) claim, based on the defendant's conduct of digitally sampling the
plaintiffs' song and including it in the album, without attributing co-
authorship of the defendant's song to all three plaintiffs."
The Fifth Circuit denied the application of section 43(a) as a means of
enforcing the attribution interest in this instance because there was no
evidence that consumers were confused or deceived by either the
228. 179 F.3d 217 (5th Cir. 1999).
229. Id. at 220. See also supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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defendant's use of plaintiffs work or the incomplete authorship
attribution.2 1' The court further observed that the plaintiffs' claim that
two of the brothers were improperly excluded from the liner notes
accompanying the defendant's album also failed to suggest consumer
confusion, especially because the liner notes did credit the band in which
the omitted brothers performed. 32
The law's failure to provide authors with a right of attribution
independent of both copyright infringement and section 43(a) is tellingly
illustrated by the facts of Batiste. Copyright law in this country
safeguards economic interests, rather than the authorial interests
protected by the right of attribution. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act can
be used to safeguard the right of attribution in reverse passing off cases
only where the court is satisfied that consumer confusion exists. Yet,
consumer confusion is a concept totally unrelated to the authorial
interests violated by a defendant's failure to attribute authorship. The
Batiste court frames the attribution inquiry improperly because it is
forced to determine attribution rights within legal frameworks ill-suited
for the application of this important right.
Whether consumers are confused by the defendant's actions, or
whether the defendant has violated the plaintiffs economically based
copyrights, are separate inquiries from whether the defendant has failed
to attribute authorship of a work to someone entitled to such attribution.
Moreover, the question whether the defendant's actual attribution in the
liner notes would satisfy an independent right of attribution is a separate
issue relating to the appropriate scope of the right of attribution.3 In
light of the current status of the law, this is not an issue the Batiste court
even could address. Clearly, the crafting and application of an
independent right of attribution can only be tackled by Congress or the
judiciary, once the need for such an explicit right is accepted.
Legal commentators often manifest skepticism regarding the benefits
for the American legal system of adopting moral rights." Of particular
concern is the perceived conflict between adequate moral rights
protection and the first amendment freedoms of authors desiring to build
231. Batiste, 179 F.3d at225.
232. Id.
233. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
234. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L REV. I
(1997); Robert A. Gorman, Federal Moral Rights Legislation: The Need for Caution, 14 NOVA L
REV. 421 (1990); Lawrence Adam Beyer, Intentionalism, Art, and the Suppression of Innovation:
Film Colorization and the Philosophy of Moral Rights. 82 Nw U. L. REv. 1011 (1988).
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upon, and interpret, the creative works of others." 5 Moreover, powerful
entertainment and publishing industries fear that their commercial
practices may be disturbed if the United States were to adopt legislation
more protective of authorial interests."S Notwithstanding these concerns,
I have argued elsewhere that the United States' legal system is woefully
inadequate in its protections of authors' interests, and that a
comprehensive moral rights package is necessary to validate and
safeguard authors' personality and spiritually based interests."
Relatively little attention has been given to the idea of unpacking the
components of moral rights protections and analyzing each strand of this
doctrine separately. Most of the legal scholarship, including my own,
treats the distinct components of moral rights as a group, and argues for
or against their implementation as a unified block. " The position
advanced in this Article is much more limited in scope. Here, I urge the
adoption of a non-waivable, explicit, and broadly defined right of
attribution. The first two parts of this Article demonstrate the theoretical
need for the recognition of this doctrine. This part addresses the ease
with which an explicit right of attribution can be promulgated.
Unlike the adoption of a more comprehensive right of integrity than
that which currently exists under VARA, 9 recognition of an express,
and wide-ranging, right of attribution can be accomplished without
substantial disruption to our existing legal system and to existing
commercial practices. Initially, it is important to note that although
neither copyright law nor section 43(a) mandate an explicit right of
attribution, with one notable exception these doctrines do not preclude
such a right. The exception is the work for hire doctrine, discussed earlier
in Part lB. Whereas adopting an explicit right of attribution might
necessitate confining the application of the work for hire doctrine to
matters involving copyright ownership rather than authorship, no
practical obstacles exist to imposing such a limitation on the existing
235. See Geri Yonover, Artistic Parody: The Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody, and
Fair Use, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. .J. 79 (1996); Kathryn Kelly, Moral Rights and the First
Amendment: Putting Honor Before Free Speech?, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS LREv. 211 (1994).
236. See Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rights in Copyright, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
795, 810-820 (2001); "Author-Stories" supra note 3, at 26- 43.
237. "Author-Stories", supra note 3; American Marriage, supra note 2; "Moral Rights for
University Employees", supra note 13; Kwall, supra note 20; VARA, supra note 97.
238. One recent exception is Dlhyung Lee's article advancing the concept of a less comprehensive
moral rights package that would still provide meaningful protection. See Lee, supra note 236, at 795.
The focus of Lee's article, however, is the right of integrity.
239. Seesupra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
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work for hire law. The American approach of presuming initial
ownership in the employer arguably can be justified when economic
rights are at issue because it is the employer who bears the financial risk
of the project.24° Nevertheless, this same justification does not support
the loss of an author's personal right of attribution.
Other legal arguments against the implementation of a more
comprehensive moral rights package have centered on doctrines such as
fair use24" ' and positions predicated on the First Amendment. These
arguments focus on the need to preserve the artistic freedom of those
who build upon others' works. Significantly, the right of attribution is
less controversial than the right of integrity in that it does not preclude
the actual use of an author's work in any particular manner. It simply
requires that the user attribute authorship to the original author of any
work used. All authors, regardless of whether they have licensed the
copyrights to their works,242 or whether they own the objects in which
their copyrights are embodied, 243 should have the right to compel
recognition for their work and to prevent false designations of
authorship. Recognition of an express right of attribution does not pose
any significant level of intrusiveness to either users authorized by
copyright owners or unlicensed users desiring to use a particular work in
their own creative endeavors. 2"
Similarly, it is difficult to understand how an explicit right of
attribution would pose a significant obstacle to copy owners wishing to
display publicly works owned by them but authored by others. 245 In all
240. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on Authorship,
Ownership, and Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1185-87, 1200-04 (2000); Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of 1976, U. CHI. L. REV. 590, 596-
97 (1987).
241. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
242. See id. § 201(d) (1) (2000) (providing for transfer of ownership of a copyright in whole or
part).
243. Section 202 of the 1976 Act provides that the ownership of a copyright is "distinct from
ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied." Id. § 202 (2000). Therefore, the
transfer of ownership of any material object in which the copyrighted work is fixed does not convey
any copyrights in the work.
244. See "Author-Stories", supra note 3, at 14 (noting that both authorized and unlicensed users
are among the relevant voices in copyright disputes). See also infra note 253and accompanying text.
245. Section 109(c) of the 1976 Copyright Act provides that the owner of a lawfully made copy
may, without the authorization of the copyright owner, "display that copy publicly, either directly or
by the projection of no more than one image at a time, to viewers present at the place where the copy
is located." See American Marriage, supra note 2, at 88-89 (suggesting that although the 1976 Act
does not require the owner of the copy to attribute authorship of the displayed work to the creator, a
state law conditioning any such public display upon appropriate attribution may be preempted on the
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these instances, requiring a right of attribution imposes a fairly
insignificant burden while safeguarding important authorial interests,246
and thus the choice to impose the attribution right in these circumstances
seems to be an easy one.247
Further, I suggest that the right of attribution should be non-waivable.
Many authors lack bargaining power and, due to either ignorance or
circumstances beyond their control, fail to protect their interests
adequately through contract law.24 I have argued elsewhere that the
failure of our law to protect attribution interests further exacerbates the
disparity of bargaining power between authors and those with whom they
contract.249 Moreover, there are no countervailing reasons supporting a
waivable right of attribution. In contrast, concern for preserving the
artistic freedom of even licensed copyright users makes a completely
non-waivable right of integrity somewhat suspect, even for staunch
moral rights advocates. 250 Even under VARA, the issue of waiver
presented the greatest degree of difficulty, and at the time the statute was
enacted, Congress directed the Copyright Office to commission a report
on the impact of the statute's waiver provision."
In light of concerns regarding freedom of expression and artistic
creativity, the costs of imposing a non-waivable right of integrity are
ground that it would conflict with the spirit of the current public display provision; therefore any
right of attribution should be enacted at the federal level).
246. See id. at 92 (arguing for the incorporation of a right of attribution into the 1976 Act because
such "would foster creativity without unduly burdening the financial incentive underlying the
present copyright scheme").
247. During the presentation of an earlier version of this Article, noted first amendment advocate
and scholar Diane Zimmerman observed that a positive right of attribution is the easiest of the sticks
in the moral rights bundle tojustify. DePaul University College of Law Colloquium Series (October,
2001).
248. See, eg., Lynn Thomson's position on why she failed to obtain a contract, discussed above
in Author-Stories, supra note 3 at 54.
249. Id. at 44, 54.
250. See American Marriage, supra note 2, at 12-13 (discussing the inherent infeasibility of a
truly non-waivable moral right).
251. VARA maintains a very limited waiver provision. Section 106A(e) (1) provides that
although an author's VARA rights cannot be transferred, they can be waived "if the author expressly
agrees to such waiver in a written instrument signed by the author." 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e) (1) (1994).
That section also provides that the instrument must "specifically identify the work, and uses of that
work, to which the waiver applies, and the waiver shall apply only to the work and uses so
identified." Id. The final report on the impact of this waiver provision was issued by the Copyright
Office in March, 1996. This report is discussed in depth in VARA, supra note 97, at 45-52.
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much greater as compared to the right of attribution.252 It is difficult to
imagine situations in which a copyright user of an author's work would
be significantly burdened by being required to attribute authorship of the
work being used.2" Traditionally the right of attribution also guarantees
an author the choice of remaining anonymous or electing attribution
under a pseudonym.254 Under a formulation of the right of attribution that
protects authors' choices of anonymity and pseudonymity, authors such
as ghostwriters who wish to preserve their privacy also could invoke
their rights of attribution. Such authors need not fear being forced to
waive their right of attribution pursuant to industry custom or practice
because this right would encompass more than just the positive right of
attribution. Therefore, relatively few if any costs exist with a non-
waivable right of attribution defined in this manner.
Given the heightened potential for consensus about the need for
recognizing an explicit right of attribution, its adoption may be more
realistic in practical terms than the adoption of a more comprehensive
moral rights package. When VARA was enacted, those who desired
stronger moral rights protections were handicapped by limited financial
resources and their inability to unite.255 Although there are indications
that moral rights is gaining strength as a political agenda, 1 6 practical
considerations suggest that a limited moral rights provision with more
widespread acceptance 257 has a greater chance of getting through
Congress than more controversial measures.
252. See American Marriage, supra note 2, at 94-95 (discussing the problematic question of
whether the right of integrity should be alienable).
253. See supra note 244 and accompanying text. Of course, issues can arise regarding the type of
contribution qualifying someone as an "author." See infra notes 258-259 and accompanying text.
254. VARA, supra note 97, at I n.2. It is worth noting that VARA does not guarantee an author
the ability to exercise her rights of anonymity or pseudonymity. Id. at 2. For an interesting
commentary on pseudonymity and the Shakespeare authorship doctrine, see John Paul Stevens,
Section 43(a) of the Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction: The Beverly W. Pattishall
Inaugural Lecture in Trademark Law, 1 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L 179, 188-90 (2002);
see also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (holding that a state
prohibition on the distribution of anonymous campaign literature violates the First Amendment).
255. "Author-Stories", supra note 3, at 41.
256. In recent years, the Screen Actors Guild has joined forces with the Motion Pictures
Association of America in proposing a treaty as part of wIPO which would afford audiovisual
performers both economic and moral rights. This effort represents the initial attempt by the United
States to propose a moral rights provision for audiovisual performers on the international front. See
"A uthor-Stories", supra note 3, at 42.
257. Cf Roger Syn, Copyright G-d: Enforcement of Copyright in the Bible and Religious Works,
14 REGENT U. L REv. 1, 16 (2001-02) ("[A]II agree it is wrong to declare someone alive today to be
the author of Shakespeare's works.").
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Of course, if Congress were inclined to enact an explicit right of
attribution, additional issues would surface immediately. First, what
should be the specific statutory vehicle in which such a right should be
contained? Second, what should be the scope of the right of attribution
and to what types of works should it attach? Regarding the first issue, the
easiest and least controversial route undoubtedly would be to amend the
copyright statute to incorporate a right of attribution for all works subject
to copyright protection. The enactment of a right of attribution outside of
VARA avoids the thorny problem of whether VARA's provisions should
be broadened to apply to all copyrighted works rather than only the
limited types of visual art to which VARA currently applies.258
The questions of the scope of the right and to what works it should
attach are more difficult. This difficulty is illustrated by the reality that
linking the right of attribution to all works subject to copyright protection
would not necessarily have provided any real assistance to either
Professor Qimron or Lynn Thomson, although such a right would have
benefited many of the other plaintiffs whose cases were discussed
throughout this Article. Qimron's situation raises the fascinating question
of whether the right of attribution should attach to works that may not be
copyrightable in the technical sense because they lack originality. -59
258. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 61 and accompanying text Under United States law, the governing standard
for determining whether Qimron's reconstruction of the Dead Sea Scroll fragments is sufficiently
original to warrant copyright protection was articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). In Feist, the plaintiffs
telephone directory was a compilation, and such works generally are vulnerable to a lack of
originality to the extent they largely incorporate material which is factual and hence
uncopyrightable. Under Feist, the standard for originality, though interpreted as constitutionally
mandated, is quite modest. Clearly, Qimron's crafting the reconstructed text seems very different
from alphabetizing names in a telephone directory. Some might argue that Qimron's efforts are akin
to a translation, and copyright law historically has extended protection to translations. See Grove
Press, Inc. v. Greenleaf Pub. Co., 247 F. Supp. 518, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); Toksvig v. Bruce
Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 1950). See also Follett v. New Am. Library, Inc., 497 F.
Supp. 304, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (noting that edited versions of an existing manuscript can be
copyrightable). Just as a translator must exercise judgment about word choices in the translation
process, so did Qimron make certain judgments regarding the reconstructed fragments. But see
Elkin-Koren, supra note 50, at 445 (suggesting that deciphering and translating represent completely
different endeavors and that Qimron's deciphered scroll is not entitled to copyright protection). On
the other hand, Feist clearly condemns all "sweat of the brow" works as not copyrightable. See
Marci A. Hamilton, Justice O'Connor's Opinion in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co.: An Uncommon Though Characteristic Approach, 38 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y. 83, 87-88
(1990) (observing that "[c]learly, the Court could have reached the result-that telephone directory
white pages are not copyrightable-without condemning all "sweat of the brow" reasoning to
purgatory" and explaining the opinion as an example of consensus building). See also Cohen, supra
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Thomson's situation raises the question of how much of a work one has
to "author" to be considered entitled to a positive right of attribution in
conjunction with the work as a whole.2 ° Cases such as Qimron and
Thomson essentially raise the more complicated question of who
constitutes an author for purposes of being entitled to a right of
attribution,26' and in different ways, these two cases push the frontiers of
the concept of "authorship."
The fact that these issues are troublesome and likely to cause
controversy and debate do not justify Congress' failure to take a first step
that is very much needed at this time. As this Article demonstrates, the
void left by the absence of an explicit right of attribution in our legal
system is not being filled by any other viable doctrine. Admittedly,
Congress may not be able to tackle initially all of the difficult issues that
might arise in conjunction with the application of an explicit, non-
waivable right of attribution. By both design and practice, however,
statutes are intended to be interpreted by the courts, and amended by
Congress if time proves modifications are necessary. 262
CONCLUSION
Although the federal enactment of an explicit right of attribution
represents a relatively modest step as compared with the passage of a
more complete, and broadly crafted, moral rights package, such a
measure is significant on a number of fronts. The enactment of a right of
attribution applicable to any author whose work is subject to copyright
protection would allow our legal system to become acclimated to moral
rights doctrine in a context that is likely to be relatively
uncontroversial. 263 Moreover, an explicit, non-waivable right of
note 25, at 383 (discussing the various types of evidence employed by scholars who engage in
reconstructing scroll fragments and the painstaking effort such an endeavor requires).
260. For an in depth treatment of this issue, see "Author-Stories", supra note 3, at 43-64. See also
David Marchese, Joint Ownership ofintellectual Property, 1999 E.I.P.R. 21(7), 364-69 (examining
joint ownership and authorship under English law).
261. See Follett v. New Am. Library, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 304, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("The concept
of authorship is elusive and inexact."). See also Lee, supra note 236, at 839 (raising and dismissing
the concern that an extensive moral rights system in the United States in not feasible because it
would necessitate too much line drawing regarding authorship status).
262. Cf. Lee, supra note 236, at 840 (noting that Congress does not necessarily need to be
"correct in its first effort" in enacting a right of integrity provision responsive to the dignity of
authors).
263. See Lee, supra note 236, at 840 ("[Tlhe limitation to visual artists for the protection of moral
rights is an unusually stringent component of American law that continues to draw suspicion, and the
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attribution would convey the critical message to authors that this country
takes their personality interests seriously. Under the current legal
framework, these authorial interests are under-recognized in our legal
landscape and therefore are protected sporadically and unpredictably.
Copyright law's focus is on economic protection rather than the spiritual
side of the creation process. The prime concern of section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act is consumer protection. Thus, to the extent authors do
receive protection for their personality interests under either of these
doctrines, such protection is the result of particular circumstances
working in the authors' favor. The adoption of an explicit right of
attribution is a measured, but effective, means of recognizing important
interests currently lacking protection in the United States.
1033
argument that virtually 'anything under the sun' could receive protection should not so sweepingly
deprive all other authors of the personal interests stemming from their work.").
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